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In traditional criminal justice systems, victims do not have the right to express their 
needs. Instead, the state articulates the victim‘s rights. Therefore, the judge‘s verdict should 
be perceived as representing the victim‘s interest. Restorative justice takes cognizance of this 
gap in representation and offers a new paradigm for viewing crime. Importantly, victims are 
given a place in the restorative justice process. Their voices are heard. Restorative justice is 
viewed as a novel concept in criminal law that assumes various forms. Many countries, 
including Indonesia, have employed restorative justice for handling crime. However, for the 
Indonesian people, restorative justice is not a novel idea since its features can be found in 
Adat law, in local wisdom reflected in community policing programs, and in Islamic criminal 
law. The introduction and adoption of modern law in Indonesia, in the mid-nineteenth century, 
has led to the decline of Adat law and of Islamic criminal law. These systems were 
marginalized and gradually replaced by the transplanted Dutch law.  
This study, grounded in the basic concept of restorative justice, aims, through textual 
analysis, to assess whether Adat law and some of the values embedded in Islamic criminal 
law fit with the characteristics of restorative justice. Field research was also conducted to 
seek answers to the research questions as textual law often differs from law in practice. The 
study found that despite the positive values ascribed to modern law, its transplanting to 
Indonesia, and replacement of traditional laws, has created several problems. These are 
rooted in the misfit of the legal culture, which is a critical factor in a legal system, with 
Indonesian culture. A new law, the Juvenile Criminal Justice System Act (JCJSA) has been 
passed by the Indonesian Parliament to replace the Juvenile Court Act (JCA). JCJSA diverges 
from the previous JCA Act through its inclusion of a restorative justice program that was not 
present in the earlier Act, and is considered to be aligned with Indonesian culture.  
The study reveals that there are two potential obstacles and challenges regarding the 
implementation of JCJSA: synchronization of law enforcement agencies, and the role of 
mediators. Another finding of the study is that conflict between public and private interests 
within restorative justice may be alleviated through consideration of Islamic criminal law 
values. The ultimate conclusion of this thesis is that restorative justice in Indonesia is 
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Restorative justice is a relatively new method for handling crimes. I emphasize 
―relatively‖ since there is contention among proponents of restorative justice as to whether 
this is a novel system or a revival of an older legal practice.  
In its current form, restorative justice first appeared in the mid-1970s in the Canadian 
city of Kitchener, Ontario at a presentence hearing of the trial of two teenagers for vandalism. 
On the other hand, this practice, or what later came to be known as restorative justice, is 
actually part of indigenous practice in many traditions across the world. There is evidence of 
this from the discovery of John Braithwaite, an Australian criminologist, following the launch 
of his book, Crime, Shame and Reintegration in 1989, that restorative justice conferences 
also occur in Africa, Melanesia, Asia, and America.
1
 
In the context of Indonesia, I hypothesize that the values of restorative justice are 
common to traditional legal systems, namely adat law and Islamic criminal law that predate 
the Dutch colonization of the archipelago and its subsequent renaming as Indonesia. This 
research is, therefore a variety of ―flashback research‖ that analyzes old practices to predict 
the potential challenges facing the modern form of restorative justice, as enacted in the new 
Juvenile Criminal Justice System Act (JCJSA) that will prevail from mid-2014. I posit that 
JCJSA is an eclecticism of adat law, Islamic criminal law, and modern law. This study makes 
an important contribution through its assessment of whether restorative justice practices 
actually exist in Indonesia, and if they do exist, what these practices can contribute to the 
development and implementation of restorative justice in Indonesia. 
 
1.1 Research Objectives  
When I first learned about restorative justice in Indonesia in 2008, I realized that the 
basic concept shared similarities with some of the features of adat law as well as Islamic 
criminal law, both of which are familiar systems in Indonesian society, particularly prior to 
Dutch colonization. Therefore, when the Indonesian Parliament passed the Juvenile Criminal 
Justice System Act in mid-2012, I aimed to predict potential obstacles and challenges that 
could ensue when implementing restorative justice in Indonesia. I formulated this central 
concern within two research questions as follows:  
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1. What are the possibilities, obstacles, and challenges entailed in the implementation of 
restorative justice for juveniles in Indonesia?  
2. How can public and private interests be bridged and balanced within restorative 
justice programs?  
The conflict between public and private interests, as articulated in my second research 
problem, is one of several issues that have been discussed within the field of restorative 
justice. I will subsequently return to this problem in an in-depth discussion in chapter five.  
 
1.2. Methodology  
This research is qualitative and relies on secondary data that are supported by primary 
data. Primary data for this research were obtained by conducting in-depth interviews using 
the purposive sampling method. 
The research focuses on the notion of restorative justice by retracing its first 
appearance. My hypothesis is that the concept and practice of restorative justice had been in 
existence for a long time prior to the Dutch colonization. My attempt here is to retrace 
Indonesian legal history to situate the contemporary practice of restorative justice in 
postcolonial Indonesia and to analyze whether adat law, community policing, and Islamic 
criminal law theory share values in com`mon with restorative justice. Based on this study, I 
predict the possibility of implementing restorative justice in its modern form. I employ 
Lawrence M. Friedman‘s concept of legal culture as an analytic tool in this thesis. I discuss 
this concept further in chapter five.  
 
1.3 Structure of Chapters  
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter one introduces the study and provides a 
brief framework of the thesis as a whole. In chapter two I discuss the basic notion of 
restorative justice and formulate categories of restorative justice. In chapter three, I present 
the three components of legal concepts and practice in Indonesia, namely adat law, Islamic 
criminal law, and community policing, and examine whether restorative justice values exist in 
their theory and practice. Chapter four entails a discussion of legal provisions on children and 
juveniles in Indonesia, including the new act for juveniles, which includes a diversionary 
model of a restorative justice program. In chapter five, in accordance with the research 
questions posed in this chapter, I discuss potential problems of restorative justice in Indonesia. 





RESTORATIVE JUSTICE  
 
2.1. Definition of Restorative Justice  
The term ―restorative justice‖ is becoming familiar in criminology and the field of 
criminal law. Moreover, restorative justice is emerging as a global trend in handling crime. To 
develop a deeper understanding of restorative justice, I would like to trace the origins of the 
term. In much of the literature, proponents of restorative justice have unanimously affirmed 
that the term ―restorative justice‖ was first coined by Albert Eglash. Most of them also agree 
that it first appeared in his 1977 paper,
2
 entitled Beyond Restitution—Creative Restitution 
which was presented at a conference on restitution in 1975.
3
 
In his paper, Eglash described three faces of justice: (1) retributive justice; (2) 
distributive justice
4
 and; (3) restorative justice. The first aspect relied heavily on punishment 
as its prominent technique for handling crimes, while the second advocated therapeutic 
treatment of offenders.
5
 The third aspect, that is restorative justice, proposed restitution as its 
characteristic feature in handling crime. Eglash referred to this as creative restitution. He 
noted that, in many respects, retributive and distributive justice shared similarities but 
differed from creative restitution. For instance, both punishment and therapeutic treatment 
were primarily concerned with the offender‘s behavior, whereas restorative justice focused on 
                                                   
2
 The exceptions are Daniel W. Van Ness and Karen Heetderks Strong who, while initially concurring with this 
view, inserted a ―clarification‖ footnote in the fourth edition of their book. They noted that Eglash developed his 
concept of creative restitution (discussed in his 1975 article) as a feature of restorative justice within his series 
of articles published in 1958 and 1959. Ann Skelton (2005), who has traced Eglash‘s sources, found that the 
term restorative justice emerged in 1956 in a book by Heinz-Horst Schrey, Hanz Hermann Walz, and W.A. 
Whitehouse. The book was, written in German and subsequently translated and adapted into English as The 
Biblical Doctrine of Justice and Law. For more details, see Daniel W Van Ness and Karen Heetderks Strong, 
Restoring Justice, An Introduction to Restorative Justice (4
th
 ed., Anderson Publishing 2010) 22.  
3
 In 1977, the paper was published in an anthology entitled Restitution in Criminal Justice: A Critical 
Assessment of Sanctions. 
4
 The concept of distributive justice discussed here should be regarded differently from the concept of 
distributive justice that is opposed to commutative justice within penal law vis-à-vis civil law. Eglash appears to 
have been referring to the neoclassical meaning of distributive justice which, in contrast to the classical meaning, 
focuses on the offender rather than on the offense. Most scholars of criminal law and criminologists refer to this 
as the rehabilitation model of criminal justice (or simply rehabilitative justice) instead of distributive justice. See, 
for example, Steve Mulligan who wrote that ―[restorative justice] is better understood through its goal and 
principles and in comparison to the paradigms that precede it, namely the retributive and rehabilitative 
philosophies of punishment.‖ Steve Mulligan, ‗From Retribution to Repair: Juvenile Justice and the History of 
Restorative Justice‘ (2009) 31. U.La Verve L. Rev. 139. 
5
 In the view of most scholars of criminal law, the most effective penal reform in modern society was 
accomplished by shifting the focus of sentencing from punishment for reasons of deserving to punishment as a 
means of rehabilitation and reform. The reform entailed a shift in the purpose of punishment from distributive to 
rehabilitative justice. See Wesley Cragg, The Practice of Punishment: Towards a Theory of Restorative Justice 
(Routledge 1992) 80. 
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the destructive or harmful consequences of that behavior, and its effect on the victim of a 
criminal act. From the perspective of the victim, he or she was disregarded by both the 
punishment and therapeutic treatment approaches, except as a witness. On the other hand, 
creative restitution made victims and their needs an important consideration and gave them a 
significant role to play, both in achieving justice and in developing a rehabilitative or 
correctional program.
6
 I suggest that besides the Kitchener experiment, creative restitution 
can also be regarded as an embryonic form of the restorative justice program. Interestingly, as 
Eglash admitted, creative restitution was designed primarily for offenders. He noted that: 
―For me, restorative justice and restitution, like its two alternatives, punishment and treatment, 
is concerned primarily with offenders. Any benefit to victims is a bonus, gravy, but not the 
meat and potatoes of the process.‖7 As we shall see later, various definitions have emerged 
with the growth of the restorative justice movement that are wider than the above-mentioned 
definition by Eglash, especially in terms of its central concern.  
Restorative justice has been widely developed and applied in many countries as a new 
paradigm for handling crime. Recently, it has developed sporadically and in various ways, 
following from its first experimental inception in North America (Kitchener) and spreading to 
European and Asian countries. However, from the perspective of indigenous law, ―restorative 
justice‖ has previously existed and been practiced in every continent.  
Howard Zehr, who is regarded as the ―father‖ of restorative justice, admits that he 
cannot identify and recognize all of the current restorative justice programs and the hundreds 
of restorative justice practitioners and academicians involved in developing restorative justice 
programs. This situation radically contrasts with the 1990s era when he was able to keep 
abreast of developments in restorative justice, including its practitioners and proponents.
8
 
Since restorative justice has evidently evolved into many forms, it is helpful to briefly 
revisit its initial definition. Zehr originally conceptualized restorative justice as a process that 
involved, to the greatest extent possible, those who had a stake in a specific offense in 
collectively identifying harms, needs, and obligations, as well as their redress, to heal and 
make things as right as possible.
9
 Certainly this definition raises some further questions, such 
as what does Zehr mean by those ―who had a stake in a specific offense?‖ How are such 
                                                   
6
 For more details, see Albert Eglash, ‗Beyond Restitution–Creative Restitution‘ in Joe Hudson and Burt 
Galaway (eds.), Restitution in Criminal Justice: A Critical Assessment of Sanctions (Lexington Books, 1977) 
91-99. <www.lorennwalker.com/blog/?p=117> accessed March 7, 2014. 
7
ibid 99.  
8
 Howard Zehr in the foreword of a book by Mark Umbreit and Marilyn Peterson Armour entitled, Restorative 
Justice Dialogue, an Essential Guide for Research and Practice (Springer Publishing Company 2011) vii.  
9
 ibid 7. 
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individuals to be defined?   
To respond to such questions and enrich the discussion, I propose another definition that 
is acknowledged as the most acceptable definition of restorative justice since it has also been 
adopted by the United Nations.
10
 This definition was proposed by Tony Marshal who argued 
that ―restorative justice is a process whereby all the parties with a stake in a particular offense 
come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the aftermath of the offense and its 
implications for the future.‖11 
Marshal‘s definition, however, raises the same question as Zehr‘s definition, namely, 
who is ―the parties with a stake in a particular offense?‖ Additionally, according to Marshal‘s 
definition, what should be restored? The latter question was reasonably resolved within 
Zehr‘s definition, that is, harm and needs resulting from a specific offense.  
To respond to the above question, we may also refer to the Economic and Social 
Council (ECOSOC) Resolution of 2002/12 regarding the Basic Principle on the Use of 
Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters. In its annex, specifically subsection 4 of 
section I on the use of terms, it states that ―Parties‖ means the victim, the offender, and any 
other individuals or community members affected by a crime who may be involved in a 
restorative process.
12
 This is in line with John Braithwaite‘s response in his book regarding 
Marshal‘s definition that a ―stake in a particular offense‖ primarily refers to the victim(s), 
offender(s), and affected communities (including the families of victims and offenders). 
Braithwaite also answered the question of what should be restored as follows: ―whatever 
dimensions of restoration matter to the victims, offenders and communities affected by the 
crime. Stakeholder deliberation determines what restoration means in a specific context.‖13 
In his audiovisual lecture, John Braithwaite explained restorative justice by describing 
its history and process in the following way:  
Restorative Justice evolved from searching for a more productive way of dealing with 
crimes rather than putting more and more people away in prison. The main idea is 
about restoring the victim, restoring the offender and restoring the community. 
Because crime hurts, justice should heal. In a typical process the victim will be asked 
to say who would they like to come to support them through the audience, then the 
offender will be asked in the same way, and the supporter of the offender with the 
offender come together with the victim and the victim‟s supporter are facilitated, they 
sit together in a circle [sic]. First, they talk about what happened, who was hurt by 
                                                   
10
 Paul McCold, ‗The Recent History of Restorative Justice: Mediation, Circle, and Conferencing‘ in Dennis 
Sullivan and Larry Tifft (eds.), Handbook of Restorative Justice (Routledge 2008) 23.  
11
 Braithwaite (n 1) 11.  
12
<www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2002/resolution%202002-12.pdf> last accessed March 7, 2014. 
13
 Braithwaite (n 1) 11.  
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what happened and what might be done to right the wrong and come up with a plan of 
action and then there will be follow up to check whether the plan of action is actually 




It is clear from the three definitions provided by Zehr, Marshal, and Braithwaite that the 
central focus has gradually shifted from Eglash‘s proposal of creative restitution which was 
designed primarily for the offender. Borrowing Eglash words, now the victim has become 
―the meat and potatoes‖ in most restorative justice programs. I will subsequently elaborate on 
the background context of why the victim has become an important party in restorative 
justice.  
For most criminal law scholars, incorporating victims—and the affected community 
when appropriate—in the criminal justice process is a relatively new idea given that the role 
of the victim in this process has been represented and taken over by the investigator (police) 
and prosecutor. Restorative justice evidently has a different core concept from that of 
criminal justice.  
Zehr‘s framework provides a clear understanding of victim-incorporation. Adopting the 
analogy of a photographic lens, Zehr explained that the choice of lens affected the outcome, 
because different lenses created different pictures. The same went for understanding a crime. 
Zehr noted that if we viewed crimes through a retributive lens, the ―criminal justice‖ process 
failed to meet many of the needs of either the victim or the offender. The process neglected 




To clarify these differences, Zehr then differentiated between criminal justice and 
restorative justice as shown in the table below:
16
 
                                                   
14
<www.anu.edu.au/fellows/jbraithwaite/lectures/index.php> last accessed March 7, 2014. 
15
 Howard Zehr, Changing Lens: A New Focus for Crime and Justice (Herald Press 2005) 178–179.  
16
 Umbreit (n 8) 8.  
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Table 1: Two Different Views of Justice  
 
Criminal Justice Restorative Justice  
  
 Crime is a violation of the law and 
the state  
 Violations create guilt  
 Justice requires the state to determine 
blame (guilt) and impose pain 
(punishment)  
 
 Central focus: Offenders getting what 
they deserve  
 Crime is a violation of people and 
relationships 
 Violations create obligation  
 Justice involves victims, 
offenders, and community 
members in an effort to put things 
right  
 
 Central focus: Victims‘ needs and 
offenders‘ responsibility for 
repairing harm  
 
 
According to Zehr, as cited by Mark Umbreit and Marilyn Peter Armour, the two 
approaches shown in the above table entail different ways of seeking justice. These 
differences can be clarified by posing the following three questions relating to a criminal 
justice system. (1) What laws have been broken? (2) Who broke these laws? (3) What do they 
deserve in response? From a contrasting restorative justice perspective, these questions would 




For Allison Morris and Gabrielle Maxwell, restorative justice is a process that 
drastically reduces the roles of the court, judiciary, and other criminal justice professionals by 




Relying on the reparative and encounter concepts,
19
 Daniel W. Van Ness and Karen 
Heetderks Strong defined restorative justice as a theory of justice that emphasizes reparation 
                                                   
17 ibid. 
18
 Allison Morris and Gabrielle Maxwell, ‗The Practice of Family Group Conferences in New Zealand: 
Assessing the Place, Potential and Pitfalls of Restorative Justice‘ in Adam Crawford and Jo Goodey (eds), 
Integrating a Victim Perspective within Criminal Justice. International Debates (Ashgate Publishing 2000) 207.  
19
The key point of the reparative concept is that crime causes harm and that justice must repair that harm while 
the encounter concept focusing on the importance of stakeholder meetings and on the many benefits that result 
from discussions of the crime among stakeholders, including what contributed to it and its aftermath. See Van 
Ness (n 2) 42; also Gerry Johnstone and Van Ness (eds) ‗The Meaning of Restorative Justice‘ in Handbook of 
Restorative Justice (Routledge 2011) 9.  
15 
 
of the harm caused or revealed by criminal behavior. It is best accomplished through 
cooperative processes that include all stakeholders.
20
 Citing Marian Liebmann, Steve 
Mulligan noted that restorative justice was a criminal justice paradigm that emphasized the 
restoration of the victim.
21
 Similarly, Lyle Keanini, citing Tony Marshal, stated that 
restorative justice was ―centrally concerned with restoration: restoration of the victim, 
restoration of the offender to a law-abiding life, [and] restoration of the damage caused by 
[the] crime to the community.‖22 
There are many more definitions proposed by restorative justice proponents that have 
resulted from the ongoing development of restorative justice programs. Some of these are 
general and can incorporate all restorative justice programs, while others leave loopholes that 
do not apply to some restorative justice programs. In many respects, whereas some 
definitions complement and complete each other, others criticize and compete with each other, 
resulting in new formulations. This will be discussed further in a subsequent section of this 
chapter on categorizing restorative justice.  
 
2.2 Historical Background of the Restorative Justice Movement 
The traditional criminal justice system clearly focuses on the offender, and how to 
punish him or her to create a deterrent effect both for the particular offender and for potential 
offenders within a society. At the same time, the system excludes the crime victims who are 
only regarded as witnesses, helping the prosecutor to prove that the offender is guilty of a 
crime that actually involves them as the injured party. This situation was perceived as a gap in 
the prevailing criminal justice system. Therefore, research was conducted and a new 
paradigm of justice emerged and has been continually evolved. This new paradigm is known 
as restorative justice. 
A discussion of restorative justice should begin by retracing the victim‘s position in the 
criminal justice system of the past when the state (in this case, court) did not yet exist, and 
which was subsequently followed by the emergence of the court that replaced the victim‘s 
interest.  
There was a time when no distinction was made between penal law and private law; a 
time when penal law was still regarded as private law.
23
 Crime victims directly sought justice 




 Mulligan (n 4). 
22
 Lyle Keanini ‗ADR in Hawaii Courts: The Role of Restorative Justice Mediators‘(2011) 12. Asian-Pac. L. & 
Pol‘y J. 174.  
23
 For further details, see Gustav Radbruch, The Legal Philosophies of Lask, Radbruch, and Dabin. Harvard 
16 
 
against offenders, often with the assistance of their kin. This system was based on the 
principle of commutative justice between coequals that is used in private law.
24
 John Gilissen 
and Frits Gorle have argued that this system prevailed over a long period, creating vigilante 
(eigenrichting) as a form of criminal dispute settlement, until the state intervened and took 
over the settlement of criminal disputes.
25
 Israel Drapkin has noted that the Twelve Tables 
(449 BCE) marked a transition from private retribution to state adjudication. Though during 
this period, there was still no clear boundary between public and private law, criminal matters 
were regulated in accordance with the eighth and ninth tables, which Drapkin, suggests was 
the embryonic form of the public law/criminal law divide.
26
 In the early development phase 
of criminal law, victims were still considered as parties that should get restitution from 
offenders. Victimologists have described the justice approach during this period as a ―victim 
justice system.‖27 
Before the existence of the state, offenders were forced by victims (or the victim‘s kin) 
to take responsible for the crimes that they had committed. Codes of behavior were based on 
social norms. Society recognized crimes such as murder and other serious act as mala in se 
(crime by itself, viewed as totally unacceptable behavior).With rare exceptions, written law 
did not yet exist, and there was no clear distinction made between public and private law. 
Society also recognized a basic system of retribution and restitution. This system was based 
on the principle of lex talionis, (an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth) and was retaliation-
based. Victims during this period could obtain restitution from offenders. With the emergence 
of the state, however, restitution gradually changed from being for victims to being for the 
state which replaced and represented the victim‘s interest. Barons played a significant role in 
changing restitution to the exacting of fines for the King (State). Thus, restitution was 
replaced by fines, and the process of excluding the victim‘s interest began. In addition, 
society was transformed from the simpler gemeinschaft society to the more complex 
gesellschaft society that encouraged individualism. Gradually, the victim justice system 
declined and was replaced by the criminal justice system.
28
 
What followed entailed a progressive marginalization, ignoring, and abandonment of 
victims‘ needs. The role of law enforcement agencies was deemed as simultaneously 
                                                                                                                                                              
(Kurt Wilk (trs) 1950) 186.  
24
 ibid 74. 
25
 John Gilissen and Frits Gorle, Sejarah Hukum, Suatu Pengantar (Legal History, an Introduction), (Refika 
Aditama 2007) 29.  
26
 Israel Drapkin M D, Crime and Punishment in the Ancient World (Lexington Books 1989) 232. 
27
 William G Doerner and Steven P. Lab, Victimology (3
rd 
ed., Anderson Publishing 2002) 2  
28
 Ibid.  
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representing the victim and public interest. The Victims‘ Rights Movement has tried to 
reincorporate victims within the criminal justice system. I suggest that the emergence of the 
victims‘ rights and restorative justice movements was triggered by dissatisfaction with the 
traditional criminal justice system, viewed as a nonintegrated system that only focuses on the 
offender and ignores the victim‘s interest; and on a critique of prison effectiveness.  
From this point forward, a historical correlation between the restorative justice 
movement and the victims‘ rights movement is evident. This observation is in line with the 
point made by Daniel W Van Ness that restorative justice theory has its roots in a number of 
reform movements. One of these is the victims‘ rights movement.29 The point made by Van 
Ness was affirmed by the victimologists William G Doerner and Steven P Lab who noted that 
the movement toward restorative justice was led by prominent proponents of victims‘ 
rights.
30
 The gains of the victims‘ rights movement have been evident in many of its 
outcomes such as victim impact statements,
31
 restitution from offenders, and state 
compensation.  
In the view of Western scholars, the achievements of the victims‘ rights movement were 
gradually introduced from Western countries to Asian countries. In Japan, for instance, 
according to Tatsuya Ota, a professor at Keio University, victim impact statements were 
introduced into judicial proceedings when the criminal procedure code was amended in 
2000.
32
 In Indonesia, the concept of the victim impact statement is a new one that has 
emerged in the latest legislation, the Juvenile Criminal Justice System Act (Act Number 
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 Article 60, verse 2 states that: ―In particular matters, the child victim is given an opportunity by justice to 
convey a statement regarding his or her related case (Dalam hal tertentu Anak Korban diberi kesempatan oleh 
hakim untuk menyampaikan pendapat tentang perkara yang bersangkutan).‖ This article, however, is unclear in 
several aspects. First, there is no further explanation as to the criteria of the ―particular matter.‖ Second, there is 
18 
 
Both concepts—restorative justice and the victims‘ rights movement—attempt to fill the 
gap in the current criminal justice system. However, restorative justice has a broader scope 
compared with the victims‘ rights movement. Restorative justice not only focuses on 
restoring victims, but also the offenders and the community that has been affected by the 
crime. It is an integrated and holistic way of dealing with crime. Till date, several countries 
have already implemented and enforced restorative justice as a new and alternative method 
for handling crimes and dispensing justice. 
Many consider the VORP (Victim Offender Reconciliation Program) to be the first 
―baby‖ of the restorative justice program in its modern form. VORP was born from the 
―Kitchener experiment‖ in 1974. At that time, two young individuals, aged 18 and 19 years, 
from Elmira in Ontario, Canada, pleaded guilty to vandalizing 22 properties (houses and cars). 
The case was published and widely discussed. Mark Yantzi, a probation officer, who was 
charged with preparing the presentence report for this case, attended a Christian group 
meeting several days before the guilty plea was filed. At the meeting, the Christian response 
to shoplifting was discussed. Yantzi then conceived of the idea of the offenders meeting the 
victims to repair the damage. In criminal procedural law, this idea was impossible to 
implement, because, as I mentioned earlier, the victims‘ interests are taken over by the 
prosecutor. Yantzi buried the idea because of the lack of a legal basis to support it. However, 
Dave Worth, a coordinator of voluntary service workers for the Mennonite Central 
Committee (MCC), encouraged Yantzi to pursue the idea. He, therefore, took a chance and 
proposed to the judge that the offenders meet with the victims and pay them back. Predictably, 
the judge refused to entertain the idea. Nevertheless, Yantzi‘s proposal seemed to have 
influenced the judge, because when the time for sentencing arrived, the judge ordered the 
offenders to have a face-to-face meeting with the victims to work out suitable restitution as a 
condition of probation. Accompanied by their probation officer, the offenders then visited all 
of their victims,
34
 negotiated restitution, and within three months had repaid their victims. 
This case was considered the inception of VORP in Canada, and is also believed to be the 
first restorative justice program. Judges have subsequently continued to order this process to 
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34
 There are two versions of this part of the post-case proceedings. According to Mark Umbreit and Marilyn 
Peterson Armor, the offenders met all of the victims, whereas Howard Zehr contends that the offenders could 
not meet two of the victims because they had moved from Elmira.  
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be carried out. Van Ness notes that in 1976, the probation officer formed a nonprofit 
organization to promote and facilitate these meetings.
35
 Coincidentally, the initial practice of 
VORP in Canada fulfilled what Eglash had suggested in terms of implementing creative 
restitution, namely the probation requirement.
36
 Zehr describes VORP as ―contagious,‖ with 
Indiana being the first state in the United States to establish a similar program in 1977–
1978.
37
 More recently, restorative justice has been discussed and implemented in several 
countries. Barda Nawawi Arief notes that within Europe, Austria, Belgium, Germany, France, 
and Poland have been applying restorative justice in many forms within their criminal code 
procedures.
38
 From its first emergence in Canada, the practice of restorative justice has been 
spreading to other continents such as Europe, Africa, and Asia.
39
 The restorative justice 
movement is unstoppable and has mutated into many forms to fit each country‘s needs.  
Regarding Japan, restorative justice is described, mostly by Western scholars, as a new 
paradigm that will likely meet with no strong resistance when it is implemented. This 
perception usually involves reference to Japan‘s cultural foundation. 40  In addition, T. 
Kawashima and Y. Noda, as cited by Hiroshi Oda, have categorized Japanese society as a 
non-litigious society, which in my view will facilitate the implementation and acceptance of 
restorative justice.
41
 Unfortunately, to date, Japan has not established a legal basis for 
implementing restorative justice, particularly as a diversionary system.
42
 However, according 
to Kei Someda, Director of General Affairs and the Planning Division of the Chiba Probation 
Office, Ministry of Justice, the police and public prosecutor may discharge cases based on 
their discretionary power.
43示談 Jidan (out-of-court settlement) is possible within this system. 
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 ed., Oxford University Press 2009) 2.  
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trial.   
43
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Nevertheless, Someda adds that further research is required as to whether or not jidan can be 
categorized as restorative justice.
44
 
In my view, the perception of minimum resistance described above becomes shaky and 
vague when applied in practice. Some efforts have been made to implement restorative 
justice in Japan, especially as a therapeutic system that operates when the offender is serving 
his/her punishment in prison. The offenders are offered an opportunity to write an apology 
letter to their victims. However, according to Yoko Hosoi, a professor of sociology at Toyo 
University, this program can hardly be described as successful, since there are not many 
offenders who are willing to participate in it.
45
 The same pessimistic outlook applies 
regarding the victims. Some victims have responded that if offenders want to apologize and 
repent for what they have done, then they should prove this by accepting a harsher penalty.
46
 
In my view this paradoxical fact can be understood to signify the decline of the Japanese 
legal culture. It seems that John O Haley‘s perspective on apology and reciprocal pardon 
being part of Japan‘s cultural foundation requires reevaluation.  
 
2.3. Categorization of Restorative Justice 
Restorative justice has been evolving and transforming widely and spontaneously. Some 
of the variations that have developed are not far from its original core, whereas others are 
considered to have developed well beyond the core of restorative justice. Debates about 
restorative justice occur not only between proponents and opponents of restorative justice, 
but also among its proponents. To better understand the concept and its variations, I will 
discuss four categories relating to restorative justice below:  
 
2.3.1 Origins 
There are two contrasting narratives of restorative justice: (1) as a novel and innovative 
system; and (2) as a modification of indigenous law. The first narrative views restorative 
justice as a subsequent development from its first experimental origins in Kitchener, as 
described earlier in this chapter. The second narrative views restorative justice as neither a 
novel nor an innovative system, but rather as an old practice that precedes any theory. 
                                                                                                                                                              
not report up to 40% of all apprehended offenders and that prosecutors suspend prosecution of possible convicts 
in nearly a third of the reported cases. See Haley (n 40). 
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According to this view, our realization that this old practice was actually restorative justice 
only came after its theorization.
47
 According to Steve Mulligan, there is no dispute regarding 
the first narrative which is different from the second narrative.
48
 Proponents of the first 
narrative argue that the second narrative provides a misleading view of restorative justice. 
Kathleen Dally has refuted what she regards as a misconception that conferencing is based on 
indigenous practices. According to Dally, efforts to write a history of restorative justice that 
romantically invoke a premodern past to justify current practices of justice are not only 
erroneous, but also unwittingly re-inscribe the ethnocentrism that they wish to avoid. Dally 
added that this misconception was ubiquitous among prominent advocates of restorative 
justice. In particular, she asserted that just because restorative justice was flexible and 
accommodating did not mean that conferencing (particularly in New Zealand) was an 
indigenous practice.
49
 However, in my view, it is difficult to detach the practice of FGC 
(Family Group Conference) in New Zealand from the practices of the Maori people who have 
greatly contributed to FGC. Moreover, historically, as noted by Gerry Johnstone, in 1988, the 
New Zealand Department of Justice commissioned a report by Moana Jackson 
recommending that the Maori be allowed to deal with conflicts that affected them in a way 
that was culturally appropriate. This implied a return to the principles of restorative justice 
that were embedded in the precolonial method of dispute resolution. A year later in 1989, the 
practice of FGC, which was partly informed by Maori philosophy and practices of justice, 
was established for youth offenders.
50
 Therefore, even though FGC cannot be said to be an 
indigenous practice, as Dally has pointed out, in the same way it also cannot be said to be an 
entirely new practice. Regarding this issue, I cite Zehr and Ali Gohar, who suggest that 
restorative justice in its modern form entails the ―revival‖ of indigenous practices:51 
―….the movement owes a great debt to earlier movements and to a variety of cultural 
and religious traditions. It owes a special debt to the native people of North America 
and New Zealand (emphasis added). The precedents and roots of this movement are 
much wider and deeper than the Mennonite-led initiatives of the 1970s. Indeed, they 
are as old as human history‖  
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2.3.2 Initial Forms 
In much of the literature, three forms of the initial practice of restorative justice are 
described, namely, Mediation, Conferencing, and the Circle. These practices are reflected in 
many programs. For instance, the Victim Offender Reconciliation Program (VORP), Victim 
Offender Mediation (VOM), and Community Mediation belong to the mediation category. 
Examples of the conferencing category are the Family Group Conference (FGC), the Wagga 
Wagga Conference, and Community Group Conferencing. Navajo Justice and the Sentencing 





2.3.2.1 Mediation  
VORP 
As I have previously discussed in relation to the historical background of the restorative 
justice movement, the first emergence of VORP dates back to 1974 in Ontario, Canada. The 
primary purpose of VORP is reconciliation, involving the healing of injuries and restoring 
right relationships, which is conducted through direct mediation (face-to-face meetings 
between the victim and offender). This program can be viewed as complementary to the 
traditional criminal justice system rather than as a diversionary model designed to ―avoid‖ the 
criminal justice system to obtain a better settlement compared with the criminal justice 
system. VORP is a faith-based program, that is, it adopts a religion-based approach, 
particularly Christian values, to reach reconciliation. Historically, VORP mediators were 
probation officers, but this does not have to be predetermined. Citing Zehr, Johnstone 
suggests it is preferable that the mediator is a community volunteer.
53
 However, it is notable 
that the community affected by the crime is not involved in this program.  
 
VOM 
According to Mark Umbreit and Marilyn Peterson Armour, VOM is a further 
evolutionary step in VORP‘s journey. Historically, the VORP experiment in Ontario was 
adopted and implemented for the first time in Elkhart, Indiana, in the United States in 1978. 
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With the passage of time, the initial experiments have gone through numerous iterations in 
the structure of the encounter, its focus, and even in its name.
54
 Paul McCold has noted that 
VOM does not stress reconciliation as VORP does, but places more emphasis, instead, on 
victims‘ healing, offenders‘ accountability, and the restoration of losses. Like its precursor, 
VOM entails direct mediation. Nevertheless, differing from the first VORP experience, VOM 
occasionally requires premediation sessions for each party and non-directive ―dialogue driven‖ 
processes.
55




Community Mediation  
Paul McCold states that community mediation was the first generation of mediation in 
the United States that emerged in the early 1970s. It was subsequently followed by VORP in 
1978, which further evolved into VOM.
57
 Community mediation programs are operated by 
community dispute resolution centers, often as adjuncts to law schools or court services that 
receive cases from the police, prosecutor, and probation officers, and offer a range of dispute 
resolution services.
58
 Community mediation is ―settlement-driven,‖ implying that the 
mediator cannot impose a decision, but may help to identify multiple paths toward an 
agreement.
59
 Unlike VORP, community mediation is a theoretically secular model, but has 
not been secular in practice.
60
 
In terms of their ongoing development, the boundaries between these three initial 
programs are becoming increasingly blurred. For example, more recently, it has also become 
possible to conduct indirect mediation for a victim who does not want to meet the offender, 
but still wants to express their feelings emanating from the crime.
61
 In Europe, most forms of 
mediation such as VOM do not mandatorily require direct meetings between the victim and 
offender.
62
 It should be noted that VOM, VORP, and Community Mediation are initial forms 
of mediation. Certainly, there is scope for developing other programs beside these three 
within this category. Take for instance VOD (Victim-Offender Dialogue) which is an 
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 Unlike VOM, which is effective in handling juvenile offenders, VOD 
is designed as a non-diversionary program for handling severely violent crimes such as 





Family Group Conference (FGC) in New Zealand 
Since 1989, New Zealand has incorporated FGC as a restorative justice program within 
its judicial process through the Children, Young Persons and Their Family Act. Compared 
with VORP and VOM, FGC has a larger number of participants. It is designed both as an 
alternative to court proceedings and as a means of providing guidance to sentencers. Youth 
justice family conferences are facilitated by a youth justice coordinator who is an employee 
of the Department of Child, Youth and Family Service. 
 
Wagga Wagga Conference  
Wagga Wagga is a small city in New South Wales, Australia. In 1991, influenced by 
FGC and John Braithwaite‘s theory of reintegrative shaming, Terry O‘Connel, a police officer, 
emulated FGC in using the conference method in Wagga Wagga.
65
 Unlike a sentencing circle, 
which uses judicial discretionary power, or FGC, which relies on an Act as its legal basis, 
O‘Connel used the Wagga Wagga conference within the ambit of police discretionary power. 
 
Community Group Conferencing 
Community group conferencing is conducted by particular communities within a wide 
range of circumstances and places such as a school, workplace, community, youth 
organization, or college campus. Community group conferencing is an incident-focused 
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Navajo justice refers to an old legal practice of the Navajo nation.
67
 It is conducted if 
the nalyeeh (compensation) demanded by the victim from the offender is unsuccessful, and is 
facilitated by a naat‟aanii (a respected peacemaker within the community). Its core practice 
is based on traditional spiritual beliefs. This practice has influenced modern forms of 
peacemaking circles such as the sentencing circle described below. 
 
Sentencing circle 
The sentencing circle first emerged in 1992, in Mayo Town, in Canada‘s Yukon 
Territory, and was based on the application of judicial discretionary power facilitated by a 
judge. At that time, a 26-year-old recidivist committed a ―new‖ crime after his previous 46 
criminal convictions. Realizing that the conventional criminal justice process had not been 
effective for this offender, the judge, probation officer, and Crown Counsel explored another 
way to engage other parties within the process of sentence determination. The judge then 
modified the courtroom setting. A circle of 30 chairs was arranged for the participants: the 
judge, lawyers, police, First Nation officials and members, probation officer, victim, and 
others. Using the circle process was advantageous for the judge compared with a traditional 
sentencing hearing.
68
 In a sentencing circle, everyone is allowed to give their opinion 
regarding the crime and the offender. In the conventional criminal justice system, there is no 
opportunity for certain parties, for example, the police to appear at the trial. Therefore, a 
sentencing circle provides a comprehensive approach that helps a judge to reach a verdict. 
The sentencing circle was thus adapted from the traditional circle ritual and has been 
incorporated within the criminal justice system 
 
2.3.3. Timeline Operation 
A timeline operation refers to the operational time frame of restorative justice. Susan L. 
Miller divides restorative justice programs into two types: diversionary and therapeutic. The 
diversionary type refers to any restorative program that is designed to operate in lieu of the 
criminal justice system process and to provide an alternative outcome. In Miller‘s view, this 
type is more offender-centered. On the other hand, the therapeutic type is more victim-
centered since it operates after the offender has been convicted. The goal of this type of 
                                                   
67
 The Navajo nation, with a population of approximately 200,000, is spread across the states of Arizona, New 
Mexico, and Utah, Johnstone (n 31) 50. 
68
 Van Ness (n 2) 29.  
26 
 
program is to empower, recover, and heal the victim.
69
 
In relation to this category, Moriss and Maxwell have identified three possible processes of 





2.3.4. Enforcement  
The last category is composed of two types of enforcement: voluntary and coercive. In 
much of the literature, these two subcategories are also referred to as ―the purist‖ and ―the 
maximalist‖ models, respectively. The purist model relies on the initial definition of 
restorative justice. Take for instance Toni Marshal, who, for many, is a purist. He defined 
restorative justice in this way: ―restorative justice is a process whereby all the parties with a 
stake in a particular offense come together to resolve collectively how to deal with the 
aftermath of the offense and its implications for the future.‖ From Marshal‘s definition, it is 
clear that the initial notion of restorative justice was to ―resolve collectively‖ and not by just 
one party. This implies the necessity of obtaining the voluntary consent of each party.  
On the other hand, maximalists take a different path, referring to Lode Walgrave and 
others who defined restorative justice as ―all activities oriented to realize justice by restoring 
harm brought by a crime.‖ 71  In the maximalist view, the words ―all activities‖ can be 
extended to include all measures for realizing justice as long the purpose is to restore the 
harm caused by the crime. This also includes coercive enforcement of restorative justice. This 
can be done, for example, through the judge‘s verdict, regardless of whether the offender 
agrees or disagrees with the verdict.  
 
2.4 Conclusion  
In short, restorative justice should be understood from a wide set of angles to obtain a 
clear and comprehensive picture of what it entails. A nation can choose which of the 
categories that I have described in this chapter best fits its national characteristics so that it 
becomes feasible to implement restorative justice. Taking account of all of the above 
categories, there are twenty-four possible permutations of restorative justice programs. For 
instance, a nation can establish a new practice of restorative justice by using a conference 
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form as a diversion, which is based on the voluntary consent of the parties in lieu of a 
criminal trial.  
This chapter has also revealed the inspirational role of religion and indigenous practices 
and their contribution to the emergence of the initial restorative justice program. Therefore, in 
the next chapter I will discuss whether restorative justice values also exist in Indonesia, 
particularly within adat law as an indigenous law in Indonesia, Islamic criminal law, and 
































RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN INDONESIA 
 
In chapter two, we examined how indigenous laws and religions have influenced and 
significantly contributed to the development of restorative justice practices. Some examples 
of the practices they have influenced include: VORP and sentencing circles in Canada and 
FGC in New Zealand. In my view these practices reflect improvements and efforts to address 
the loopholes and incompleteness of the prevailing criminal justice system, which does not 
have scope for alternative settlement processes like restorative justice. In the case of 
Indonesia, to date, no amendment has been made to recognize restorative justice within the 
Indonesian criminal code procedure (Act Number 8/1981). The process of Indonesia‘s 
criminal justice system, as stipulated in the criminal procedure act, basically exhibits the 
same pattern found in other civil law countries. In general,
72
 the investigator (police) will 
start to investigate a case whenever one of the following three conditions is met: a report 
(laporan) is filed with the police, a complaint (pengaduan) is filed with the police, or the 
perpetrator is caught red-handed while committing a crime. The investigator is obliged to 
investigate whether either the report or the complaint actually relates to a criminal offense. If 
this is affirmed, the next stage is to find the suspect. The case is then transferred to the 
prosecutor to determine the indictment that will be brought against the accused in a trial. 
Subsequently, the judge in the trial will try the case and will finally hand down a verdict on 
whether to sentence or acquit the defendant. Both the defendant and the prosecutor have the 
right to file an appeal to a high court and to the Supreme Court for the second and final 
appeal. 
The above criminal justice system process is illustrated in the scheme below:  
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The above scheme shows that the current criminal justice system is an offender-centered 
model. All of the law enforcement agencies are focused on the offender. The victim has no 
place to express his/her interest in the case that involves him/her as the injured party. The 
victim‘s role in this system is to help the law enforcement agencies as a witness to prove that 
the offender is guilty. The figure below clarifies the position of the victim in this system.  
 









The above scheme depicts the agencies to which the victim will report her/his case after 
realizing that s/he has become a crime victim. Subsequently, s/he will become a witness of 
the crime, helping the law enforcement agencies to prove that the offender is blameworthy by 
giving testimony in a police investigation report and testifying in a criminal court. It is 
evident from the above two schemes that the victim‘s interest has been abandoned and 
ignored in this system. This exclusion is what the restorative justice notion aims to reframe 
through a holistic perception of crime.  
This chapter builds on several questions. Whereas we have confirmed the absence of 
restorative justice values within Indonesia‘s current criminal code procedure, my first 
question is do these values exist within the country‘s indigenous practices and religion? If 
they do exist, to what extent has the Indonesian government acknowledged them? Is there 
any possibility of transforming them into new forms that can be applied in the current era? 
However, the discussion in this chapter is limited to indigenous law, which is known in 
Indonesia as adat law (or in simplified terms as customary law), Islamic criminal law, and 
community policing. The reason for focusing on just these three practices is because they 
have played an important role in the development of Indonesia‘s legal practices and 




Law Enforcement Agencies 






3.1. Restorative Justice in Light of Customary Law: Adat, Adat Law, Customary Law, 
and Adat Criminal Law  
Indonesia‘s country-based legal tradition has been categorized, mostly by foreign 
scholars, as that of civil law as opposed to common law. Civil law is based on Romano-
Germanic law which is differentiated from Anglo-Saxon (Anglo-American) law. The key 
difference between civil law and common law is that civil law relies less on court precedents 
and more on legal codes, whereas common law places more emphasis on court precedents.
73
 
Hence, the choice of legal system to be established in a country is a critical matter that has 
significant consequences. The civil law system, because of its heavy reliance on codes, is 
more rigid in the context of law enforcement. Once an individual‘s behavior is determined to 
constitute a criminal offense, the criminal justice system is set in motion and is responsible 
for settling the case.  
The choice of a legal system for Indonesia was made by its former colonizer, the 
Netherlands, and was based on the civil law tradition. This included the field of criminal law. 
After independence, the Indonesian government retained the civil law tradition.
74
 The first 
codified Indonesian criminal code was entitled Wetboek van Straftrecht voor Netherlands 
Indische/WvSNI (Criminal Code for Netherlands Indie)
75
 which was established in 1915
76
 and 
came into effect on January 1, 1918. The code applied to anyone who committed a criminal 
offense in Netherlands Indie. This period was the cornerstone for the application of modern 
law as a means of settling criminal cases in Indonesia, and the induction of a relatively new 
system for settling criminal disputes. Prior to this time, most Indonesians applied indigenous 
adat law and Islamic law. In fact, most adat law is influenced by Islamic law and is similar to 
customary law in light of its common law tradition.  
Therefore, the perception that Indonesia is a ―pure‖ civil law country is incorrect. Fachri 
Bey notes that the Indonesian legal system is based on Roman-Dutch law, customary law, 
and Islamic law.
77
 Customary law, as I will discuss, is closer to common law than to civil law 
in term of its flexibility. The term ―customary law‖ in the Indonesian context is actually used 
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to translate the term adat law (adatrecht), which does not always share the same meaning as 
customary law. However, since there are a number of similarities between these terms, many 
scholars simplify them. To clarify the differences between adat, adat law, customary law, 
and adat criminal law, I will present an overview of each of them below.  
 
3.1.1 Adat  
According to several sources, the term ―kebiasaan‖ (customary) is believed to originate 
from the word adah, an Arabic word that refers to a variety of behavioral actions that are 
repeatedly carried out.
78
 This variety of repetitive action is what leads to the association 
between the terms adat and custom (kebiasaan). Consequently, adat has been defined as 
community behaviors that are steady, constantly performed, and, thereby, obligatory.
79
 
However, I Gede AB Wiranata asserted other meanings when defining adat. He argued 
that adat should be assumed by a community to be a preformed custom that exists both 
before and after the community.
80
 This definition implies that adat is also open to new action 
(to become adat, emphasis added), as long as the previously mentioned conditions apply.  
 
3.1.2 Adat Law (Adatrecht). 
The word ―law‖ is translated as the Indonesian word “hukum.” So, adat law is a 
translation of hukum adat, or of the well-known term, adatrecht. Like adat, hukum originated 
from Arabic, and specifically from the word ―hukm.‖ The plural form of hukm is ahkam 
which means order, command, or provision.
81
 Christiaan Snouck Hurgronje, a Dutch legal 
scholar, coined the term adatrecht that appeared in his book De Acehers (Acehnese people) in 
1894. He also used this term, translated in English as ―adat law,‖ to differentiate between a 
social control system that included sanctions and the singular ―adat” denoting a social 
control system without sanctions.
82
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Hurgronje‘s differentiation laid the ground for further research to clarify the basic 
distinction between the terms adat and adat law. His definition was widely accepted and 
adopted by subsequent generations of adat law experts such as Cornelis Van Vollenhoven, Ter 
Haar, Soepomo, and Soekanto.
83
 The extent of the acceptance of this definition of adat law is 




―This set of adats is mostly not written or codified, but has coercive power and 
sanctions (and is therefore law). They have legal consequences. This set is called adat 
law (hukum adat).‖  
In his statement above, Soekanto clearly wished to emphasize the point that coercion, 
sanctions, and legal consequences were the accepted parameters for differentiating adat and 
adat law.  
 
3.1.3 Customary Law  
As previously stated, adat can be understood as repetitive behavioral actions. This 
definition then leads to the association of adat with ―custom‖ since the two words are 
virtually identical from this perspective. This equation of the two terms continues when the 
word law is added to both adat and custom, the latter becoming customary law (hukum 
kebiasaan). In my view, this generalization also results from the definition of customary law 
that precedes the definition of adat law. Perceptions of there being some similarity between 
the two terms lead to the simplification that customary law is also adat law. Black‟s Law 
Dictionary, for example, defines customary law as follows:
85
 
―Law consisting of customs that are accepted as legal requirements or obligatory rules 
of conduct; practices and beliefs that are so vital and intrinsic a part of a social and 
economic system that they are treated as if they were laws.‖  
From the above definition, customary law is basically law that is derived from custom 
and that is accepted as legal requirements or obligations regarding how to behave. This 
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definition is close to the definition of adat law provided by Cornelis Van Vollenhoven as 
being: ―a body of rules of behavior of natives and foreign Orientals, which on the one hand 
are enforced by sanction (therefore ―law‖) and, on the other hand, are not codified (therefore 
―adat‖).‖86 Since both definitions are rooted in custom, many writers have simplified these 
two terms. However, adat law has other characteristics that differ from customary law which 
I will discuss a little further on in this chapter.  
The equation between adat law and customary law is not acceptable, as Van Dijk, a 




―It is not appropriate to translate adatrecht as customary law (hukum kebiasaan) for 
replacing hukum adat (adat law)…because what is meant by customary law is a set of 
rules which emerge by virtue of custom. This means that people have been behaving 
in a certain way for so long that a desirable rule of conduct emerged regarding their 
behavior. When people were looking for a real source from which the rule was 
established, almost always they would find a certain community in the society as the 
base.‖ 
 
Analyzing Van Dijk‘s objection, I Gede AB Wiranata concluded that it referred to 
different legal sources of customary law and adat law. Adat law is based on the existence of a 
certain community that has ―legislative power‖ to set rules in a society, whereas customary 
law is not based on legislative power.
88
Adat law is a characteristic Indonesian or Malay-
Polynesian law, whereas customary laws are found around the world. Customary law in the 
Netherlands is known as gewoonterecht, that is, custom that has force and power, but often 
has to contend against legal acts (wettenrecht).
89
 In this regard, the anthropologist, Bronislaw 
Malinowski asserted that the difference between a custom and law is based on two criteria: 
the source of its sanction and its enforcement. In the case of custom, the community, rather 
than an individual or group, is the source of both its sanction and its enforcement, whereas in 
the case of a law, the sources of sanction and enforcement are competent central agencies, or 
specific bodies within a community.
90
 
This argument also applies to the distinction between customary law and adat law. Van 
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Dijk wrote that customary law emphasizes repetition of customs that then become law. By 
contrast, even though there is an element of custom in adat law, it places more emphasis on a 
particular community institution that has the authority to establish it as law.
91
 
Thus, even though adat law is often translated as customary law, and many writers have 
drawn a simplistic association between the two terms, it is important to understand the 
difference between them. Roelof H. Haveman, translated adat law as being customary law, 
but also explained the difference between the terms. He wrote: ―Adat law is customary law. 
More specifically: adat law is a type of customary law.‖92 So, even though Haveman stated 
that adat law was customary law, he then specified that adat law was a type of customary law. 
Furthermore, in an explanatory footnote, he clarified that the word adat came from an Arabic 
word that means ―custom.‖ However, he noted that adat law extended a little further than 




Haveman‘s explanation is in line with the view of Cornelis van Vollenhoven. According 
to Van Vollenhoven, adat law is something other than customary law (gewoontenrecht) since 
its legal sources also include village ordinances (peraturan-peraturan desa), ordinances of 




In conclusion, adat law evidently differs from customary law. Whereas some of the 
characteristics of adat law fit with the definition of customary law, others, as I have shown, 
do not. 
3.1.4. Adat Criminal Law  
Adat criminal law or unwritten criminal law is known in Dutch as ongeschreven 
strafrecht.
95
 According to Soerojo Wignjodipuro, adat criminal law is one of the areas within 
the field of adat law that was marginalized by colonial law.
96
 Nils Cristie, a Norwegian 
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criminologist, paints a similar picture when he states that the King‘s justice ―stole conflict‖ 
from citizens. As a consequence, by 1200 CE, local systems of restorative justice were more 
or less extinguished in most of Europe.
97
 In his comparison of Scotland and Indonesia, John 
Braithwaite pointed to the total disappearance of restorative justice in Scotland during the 
nineteenth century, which he attributed to English dominance. By contrast, he argued that in 
Indonesia, adat law was never extinguished by the Dutch. In fact, adat criminal laws work in 
parallel with Dutch criminal law of the Indonesian state.
98
 In my view, Braithwaite‘s 
statement is only partially correct. The existence of adat law (including adat criminal law) is 
acknowledged and recognized within the Indonesian Constitution.
99
 However, in practice, if 
adat law conflicts with state law, then law enforcement agencies will use state law instead of 
adat law. 
To present a clear picture of adat criminal law, I commence this section with a 
description of the term adat criminal law. This is actually a vague concept since adat law 
does not differentiate between criminal law and civil law as European law does. Moreover, as 
Soepomo explains, adat law does not make a separation between an infringement of the law 
that obliges the accused to take responsibility based on the judge‘s verdict within a criminal 
court, and a tort that obliges the defendant to take responsibility within a civil court.
100
 This 
inclusion of criminal and civil law within adat law is largely unrecognized.  
The distinction between criminal law (public law) and civil law (private law) originates 
in Europe and in Western legal culture. According to Hans Kelsen, the division was based on 
legal relations. Private law represents relations between coordinates of equal legal standing, 
whereas public law represents a relation between a superordinate subject and a subordinate 
subject, the former being of higher legal standing than the latter. Kelsen further noted that the 
characteristic relation in public law is that between the state and a citizen.
101
 
Since adat law does not separate criminal law and civil law, scholars have employed 
different terms when referring to adat criminal law. Barend Ter Haar Bzn tends to use the 
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term delict adat, while Soerjono Soekanto prefers adat deviation law (hukum penyelewengan 
adat).
102
 I Gede AB Wiranata uses the term adat infringement law (hukum pelanggaran adat), 
which is a translation from the Dutch term adat delicten recht. Roelof H. Haveman clearly 
selected adat criminal law as he used this for his book title. I prefer to use hukum pidana adat, 
because the English translation is close to Haveman‘s concept of adat criminal law. Even 
though there are many different terms, they all refer to the same meaning of criminal law in 
the sense of modern law, as adopted by European scholars.  
The emergence of the various terms described above can be attributed to the fact that in 
principle, adat law simply combines what modern law divides, that is, criminal law and civil 
law. Therefore, scholars‘ efforts have tended to focus on categorizing adat law in the same 
frame as modern law categories, one set of which is criminal law and civil law.  
Apart from the issue of terms, a second challenge for scholars is to define what adat 
criminal law is. Some scholars have devised definitions to clarify adat criminal law that are 
generally based on the characteristics of criminal law. For example, Van Vollenhoven defined 
adat criminal law (delict adat) as a prohibited act.
103
 This definition had been further 
analyzed by Anto Soemarman, for whom the central point of delict (criminal act) within 
delict adat is that it is a prohibited act. A prohibited act that entails a sanction as its legal 
consequence is, within criminal law, identical with a criminal act or offense. However, as 
mentioned earlier, adat law differs from European and Western jurisprudence in that it does 
not separate criminal law from civil law. Therefore, Van Vollenhoven‘s conception of 
delictadat (adat criminal law) contains all of the forms and variations of the act, including its 
subjective and objective consequences.
104
 Moreover, the basic difference between delict adat 
and criminal law (strafrecht) is that the prohibited act, including its sanction, is already 
stipulated within an act (law), whereas in delict adat, a part of the prohibited act is not 
stipulated in advance. Therefore, the form of the act and its sanction are not static.
105
 
Ter Haar, a student of Van Vollenhoven, subsequently defined a delict as any 
disturbance to the balance, and any obstruction of properties of a person or a group, 
materially or immaterially. These acts (disturbances or obstructions) then invoke a reaction, 
that is, an adat reaction, the severity of which is decided by adat law. Because the balance (of 
the cosmos and the community) has been disturbed, it should be healed and restored to what 
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it previously was (mostly through the payment of money or goods).
106
 I Gusti Ketut Sutha 





So according to the concept of adat law, if the provision of [the] adat norm has been 
breached, then an adat reaction will be invoked. Essentially, the substance of [an] 
adat reaction is not affliction or pain but returning the cosmic balance which has been 
disturbed by the obstruction.  
 
Soepomo, another student of Van Vollenhoven, defines adat criminal law in a similar 
way to his mentor. He views all acts that conflict with the adat rule of law as illegal acts. 
Moreover, he contends that adat law equips itself with the means to repair the law 
(rechtserstei) if adat law is breached.
108
 
I Gede AB Wiranata argues that adat infringement law encompasses all acts or 
occurrences that contravene the appropriateness, harmony, order, safety, sense of justice, and 




Nyoman Sarikat Putra Jaya, citing Lesquiliier, concludes that an adat criminal act 
(tindak pidana adat) is an act that violates the sense of justice and appropriateness within a 
community, thereby disturbing the peace and balance of the community. An adat reaction 
emerges to heal and restore the peace and balance that has been broken. It aims to restore a 
―magical‖ peace and to eliminate or neutralize inauspicious circumstances that were caused 
by the adat infringement.
110
 The above explanation of how adat criminal law works 
highlights a basic difference between criminal law that is rooted in European law and adat 
criminal law. Adat criminal law focuses on restoring the damage that was caused by the 
infringement, whereas criminal law focuses on the offender and overlooks the others who are 
involved. In this regard, Artidjo Alkotsar, a judge of the Supreme Court explained that the 
ethical relevance of dispute settlement procedures within adat law is of maintaining the 
relationship between the dispute parties and, in turn, between the dispute parties and the 
community as a whole. The resolution of the dispute within adat law is always oriented 
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toward ―dispute settlement‖ in a holistic sense, whereas in European or Western procedural 
law, the orientation is toward handing down a verdict. Therefore, in adat law, after 
conducting dispute settlement, personal relations and community kinship within the adat 
community continue to be maintained. Conversely, in Europe and in Western law, after the 
verdict is given, the relationship among the dispute parties is severed.
111
 
The purpose of adat criminal law is basically to maintain the relationship between the 
offender, victim, and the community so that balance and peace within the community can be 
restored. Adat criminal law shares the same purpose as restorative justice. This can be 
concluded from John Braithwaite‘s statement below:112 
 
―For informal justice to be restorative justice, it has to be about restoring victims, 
restoring offenders, and restoring communities as a result of participation of a 
plurality of stakeholders. As long as there is a process that gives the stakeholders 
affected by an injustice an opportunity to tell their stories about its consequences and 
what needs to be done to put things right, and so long as this is done within a 
framework of restorative values that include the need to heal the hurts that have been 
felt, we can think of the process as restorative justice.‖ 
 
This view that adat criminal law and restorative justice share the same purpose may be 
examined by investigating adat criminal law itself. According to Soekanto, there are four 
ways of identifying adat law,
113
 one of which is from unwritten norms that can be 
investigated by living within the adat community.
114
 In Indonesia, adat law has been 
categorized by Van Vollehoven into 19 Circle Laws (Rechtskringen).
115
 Preliminary field 
research within the Baduy community, which practices the nineteenth adat law based on Van 
Vollenhoven categorization, revealed that their criminal procedure scheme entailed some 
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Legend of Figure:  
Jaro Tangtu = Head of a village within inner Baduy (Baduy Dalam), which has three villages 
that uphold sacred values. 
Seven Jaro/Jaro Dangka = Village figures who have an investigation function. There are 
seven such persons spread out across seven villages in Baduy. 
Puun = Top leaders of the Baduy community who live in each of the three villages of inner 
Baduy.  
 
The above scheme demonstrates that some values or features of restorative justice do 
exist within adat criminal law. Immediately after the crime occurs, the families of the victim 
and of the offender intentionally meet to put things right by discussing what might be done to 
repair the harm caused by the crime. This process occurs spontaneously in Baduy, because 
everyone in the community is connected to each other. Therefore, if someone commits a 
crime, s/he does not just injure the victim, but simultaneously injures the entire community 
by disrupting harmony within the community. In addition, s/he brings shame to her/his own 
family. That is why most families of offenders do not resist the ―friendly pacification‖ 
process. However, a disagreement may arise during this stage. Therefore, a mediator, known 
 Jaro Tangtu 
 Seven Jaro/Jaro 
Dangka 
 
Friendly Pacification  
between parties (families) of 
victim and offender  
 Apologies and mutual 
forgiveness (Silih 
ngahampura) 









Hearing of evidence   
Exiled and Placed at “custody center” for 40 
days:  
1. Residents of Cibeo to Cihulu 
2. Residents of Cikartawana to 
Sarokokod/Panyaweyan 
3. Residents of Cikeusik to Cibengkung  
 
 
Innocent    





 Jaro Tangtu 
 Seven Jaro/Jaro 
Dangka 
 
 Apologies and mutual 
forgiveness (Silih 
ngahampura) 




 Advice (Dipapatahan) 
 Banishment 
(Dikaluarkeun) 
 Cleansing ritual for light 
and medium offenses 
(Ngabokoran)  
 Cleansing ritual like 
bokor but resulting in 
the victim‘s or 
offender‘s death   (Serah 
pati)  
 
In certain cases an adat oath will be proclaimed 
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as a jaro tangtu, may intervene to settle the case during a subsequent adjudication stage. 
Interestingly, up to this point, the Baduy criminal dispute settlement procedure has the same 
methodology as the Navajo peacemaking circle that I briefly described in chapter two. The 




Nevertheless, adjudication does not always end well. A deadlock situation may lead to a 
disagreement. Therefore, the scheme provides subsequent stages to cope with failed 
mediation. In terms of restorative justice, there are two important points to emphasize during 
the subsequent stage. First, the victim‘s interest is neither abandoned nor ignored. In this case, 
the ‗state‘ provides for penalties that represent the victim‘s interests, namely, apology and 
mutual forgiveness and recompense. Second, these penalties may be imposed coercively. 
According to the maximalist as opposed to the purist conception of restorative justice, the 
outcome of the restorative justice process may be enforced. Interestingly, while proponents of 
restorative justice engage in a debate as to whether restorative justice should be implemented 
voluntarily or may be imposed forcefully, the Baduy community has been practically 
implementing a combination of the two approaches: voluntary and coercive (in case of 
failure) for hundreds of years.  
 
3.2. Restorative Justice Values from an Islamic Criminal Law (Jinayat) Perspective 
 
Islamic law is mostly portrayed as a cruel law, typically by pointing to the amputation of 
hands as a punishment for theft, or to stoning for adultery. Moreover, after the 9/11 incident, 
Islam-phobia has become widely apparent in many countries. However, the incident appears 
to have also aroused curiosity to learn more about Islam itself. According to Nawal H. 
Ammar, Islam is currently an expanding religion in North America.
118
 Leaving aside this 
image and the growth of Muslim populations around the world,
119
 the aim of this section is 
essentially to assess whether restorative justice values exist within Islamic criminal law.  
Islam came to Indonesia through Muslim traders who traveled to the Southeast Asian 
region during an early period of Islam (the eighth century CE).
120
Samudera Pasai is 
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recognized as the first Islamic Kingdom that was located in Northern Sumatera (Aceh) and 
founded during the early thirteenth century CE.
121
 Since that time, Islam spread across the 
archipelago with the emergence of other Islamic kingdoms. There is some evidence that 
Islamic law prevailed during the era of Islamic kingdoms that continued to coexist in 
Netherland Indie (now Indonesia).
122
 Its power then declined with the advent of Dutch 
imperialism that included the assumption of control over government and replacement of the 
law.  
Indonesia is often categorized as a Muslim-majority country and simultaneously as 
containing the world‘s largest Muslim population. 123  A total of 87.2% of Indonesia‘s 
population is Muslim.
124
 Therefore, a discussion of restorative justice from the perspective of 
Islamic law might offer a significant approach for implementing restorative justice in 
Indonesia.  
Islamic law currently prevails only in civil matters in Indonesia.
125
 However, an 
exemption has been made for Aceh province. In 1999, with an Act as its legal basis, Aceh 
gained special autonomy in certain areas, one of which was to implement shariah
126
 (Islamic 
law), which includes Islamic criminal law.
127
 A decade has passed since 2004 when Islamic 
criminal law first prevailed in Aceh regarding certain criminal offenses such as adultery, 




The question that grounds this section is whether any restorative justice values exist 
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within Islamic criminal law. If there are such values, how can they contribute to the 
implementation of the Juvenile Criminal Justice System Act (Act Number 11/2012)? Like 
adat criminal law, Islamic criminal law (jinayat) is one branch of shariah law that was 
marginalized by colonial law. Shariah means Islamic law that applies to all aspects of a 
Muslim‘s life. Its branches include: ibadah (worship), jinayah (criminal law), muamalah 
(civil law), siyasah (politics), Al Mashrafiyah-Al Islamiyah (Islamic banking), and Islamic 
humanitarian law. In this section, I focus only on jinayah to assess whether it includes 
restorative justice values.  
Criminal offenses (Al-jarimah,) in Islamic criminal law (jinayah) are divided into three 
categories. These are: Hudud, Qisas and Diyyat, and Ta‟zir as I will discuss below. 
 
3.2.1 Hudud 
Hudud denotes criminal offenses for which the had penalty is imposed. According to 
Abdul Qadir Audah, had (the singular form of hudud) means a penalty that has already been 
determined by syara (Al Quran and Al Hadist)
129
 and constitutes God‘s right (haq Allah). 




1. The penalty is specific and definite, implying that the penalty has already been 
prescribed and has no minimum and maximum limitations.  
2. The penalty constitutes God‘s right (a public right), implying that there is no place for 
individual rights, and if there is, then God‘s right would take precedence for this 
offense.  
As mentioned by Muslich, individual rights should be understood as the rights of the 
victim of a crime. In the framework of traditional criminal law, hudud can be understood to 
refer to criminal offenses that violate public rights, thereby leaving no place for the 
intervention of individuals‘ (victims‘) rights in the criminal justice system process. According 
to Nawal H. Ammar, hudud are the most serious crimes, because the offenders have violated 
God‘s right by injuring harmony within the community that is his creation and a public right.  
Most Islamic scholars agree that there are seven criminal offenses that are categorized 
as hudud. These are: (1) Zina (adultery, including fornication), (2) Qadzaf (slander),
131
 (3) 
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Syurb Al-khamr (drinking alcohol), (4) Sirqah (theft), (5) Hirabah (highway robbery), (6) Al-
baghyu (rebellion), and (7) Riddah (apostasy) 
Islamic criminal law (jinayah) is a system that employs not just retributive justice, but 
also restorative justice.
132
 In my view, a perusal of the seven hudud crimes reveals the 
existence of values of restorative justice within theft and highway robbery. Both crimes 
provide dhaman (redress) as their penalty. Moreover, redress applies to the victim and not to 
the state as in fines. The victim‘s interest in this type of crime is represented by the state, 
which simultaneously represents public interest.  
 
3.2.1.1 Theft 
The legal basis for hudud relating to theft is prescribed in Quran surah Al Maidah: 
38.
133
 Even though the penalty of hand amputation for a theft is stipulated in the above verse, 
its implementation is more complicated than is commonly thought. As with other common 
forms of criminal law, actus reus and mens rea are also required. Muslich described the 
following four criminal elements of theft:
134
 (1) Taking (other‘s) property furtively, (2) the 
object that is stolen is property,
135
 (3) the property belongs to another person, and (4) the act 
is committed with an unlawful intention. The first three elements belong to the domain of 
actus reus, whereas the last belongs to mens rea. In crimes of theft, there are three kinds of 
evidence that are presented to prove whether the offender is guilty or innocent. These are 
evidence provided through: (1) witnesses; (2) a confession; and (3) an oath.
136
 
The punishments for theft are redress (dhaman) and hand amputation. Both 
punishments vary in the way they are executed, depending on each school. Hanafi‘s school 
                                                   
132
 See Mutaz M. Qafisheh, ―Restorative Justice in the Islamic Penal Law: A Contribution to The Global System‖ 
(2012) Vol. 7 Issue 1 January – June, International Journal of Criminal Justice Sciences, 487.  
133
 This states: ―[as for] the thief, the male or the female, amputate their hands in recompense for what they 
committed as a deterrent [punishment] from Allah. And Allah is exalted in Might and Wise [sic]‖ (Sahih 
International translation).  
134
 Muslich (n 130) 83.   
135
 This element requires that several conditions be met for the application of the punishment of hand 
amputation. According to Hadist, narrated by Imam Bukhari (Hadist Number 6291), one of the conditions is that 
the value of the property stolen should reach a quarter dinar (one dinar is equivalent to 4.25 grams of 22k gold). 
If the value of the stolen property is less than this prescribed value, the crime will be diverted and categorized as 
ta‟zir instead of hudud.  
136
 Muslich (n 130) 87–8. The witnesses should consist of two men or a combination of one man and two 
women to prove guilt. If there are no witnesses, the case should be dropped. The number of confessions is 
subject to debate. According to the Maliki, Hanafi, and Syafi‘i schools, one confession is enough to punish the 
offender. However, according to Hambali‘s school and Syiah Zaidiyah, the confession should be proclaimed 
twice. The last evidence, i.e., oath, is a development of the Syafi‘i school to resolve a situation in which there is 
none of the two previous evidences (witness and confession). The offender‘s refusal to proclaim the oath, and 
the proclamation of an oath by the victim, can be considered as sufficient to hand down a punishment. However, 
the last kind of evidence is subject to debate even within the Syafi‘i school.  
44 
 
argues that redress can only be imposed when hand amputation is not imposed and vice 
versa.
137
 According to Syafi‘i and Hambali‘s school, both sentences can be simultaneously 
applied since hand amputation constitutes God‘s right, whereas redress constitutes the 
victim‘s right.  
 
3.2.1.2 „Highway‟ robbery (hirabah) 
Capital punishment is applicable to highway robbery when it involves the killing of the 
victim. The legal basis is the Qur‘an surah Al Maidah: 33. 
―The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger, and strive 
with might and main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting 
of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land: that is their disgrace in this 
world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the Hereafter.‖ (Yusuf Ali translation) 
However, if the offender/s regret/s and repent/s (tawba) before they are apprehended, 
the above-mentioned had punishment should be dropped. This is stated in the next verse of 
the same chapter (surah):  
―Except for those who return [repenting] before you apprehended them. And know that 
Allah is Forgiving and Merciful.‖ (Al Maidah:34)  
However, even though the had punishment (in term of God‘s right/public right) can be 
forgiven and, therefore, nullified, based on the above verse, the victim‘s right is not 
automatically nullified. Therefore, in this case, the offender is still liable to provide redress 
for the victim. In case the crime leads to the death of the victim, if the offender repents, the 
crime will be mitigated and categorized as Qisas and diyat.
138
 
3.2.2. Qisas and Diyyat 
According to Ibrahim Unais, Qisas means handing down a punishment to the offender 
that is similar to what s/he has done (to the victim).
139
 Like hudud, Qisas and Diyyat are 
criminal offenses that include punishments that are already determined by syara (shariah). 
However, unlike hudud, the individual rights of victims are the predominant rights in Qisas 
and diyyat. Therefore, the victims within the Qisas and Diyyat offense categories may 
intervene in the criminal justice process. In fact, the victim is the paramount party in Qisas 
and Diyyat.  
The criminal offenses in Qisas and diyyat consist of just two criminal offenses: 
                                                   
137
 The reason is that Al Quran only stipulates hand amputation without stipulating redress.  
138
 Muslich (n 130) 104-05. 
139
 ibid 149.  
45 
 




1. Murder (Alqatlul amdu). 
2. Manslaughter that resembles murder (Alqatlu syibhul amdu).  
3. Manslaughter by mistake (Alqatlul khoto). 
4. Deliberate maltreatment (Aljinaayatu ala maaduunannafsi amda).  
5. Non-deliberate maltreatment (Aljinaayatu ala maaduunannafsi khoto). 
 
The legal basis for Qisas is prescribed in the following Al-Quran surahs: 
a. Al-Baqarah: 178141 
―O you who believe, Al Qisas (the law of equality in punishment) is prescribed for you 
in case of murder: the free for the free, the slave for the slave, and the female for the female. 
But if the killer is forgiven by the brother (or the relatives, etc.) of the killed against blood-
money, then adhering to it with fairness and payment of the blood-money to the heir should 
be made in fairness. This is an alleviation and a mercy from your Lord. So after this whoever 
transgresses the limits (i.e. kills the killer after taking the blood money), he shall have a 
painful torment.‖ 
 
b. Al-Maidah: 45. 
―And we ordained therein (Torah) for them: ―life for life, eye for eye, nose for nose, ear 
for ear, tooth for tooth, and wounds equal for equal.‖ But if anyone remits the retaliation by 
way of charity, it shall be for him an expiation. And whosoever does not judge by that which 
Allah has revealed, such are the zalimun (polytheists and wrong-doers—of a lesser degree).‖  
 
c. Al Baqarah:179  
―And there is (a saving) of life for you in Al Qisas (the law of equality in punishment), 
O men of understanding, that you may become Al-Muttaqun [the pious believers of Islamic 
Monotheism who fear Allah much (abstain from of all kind of sins and evil deeds which He 
has forbidden) and love Allah much (perform all kinds of good deeds which He has 
ordained)].‖ 
From the verses above, Qisas at first glance appears to share the same sense of 
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retaliation as in Lex Talionis.
142
 However, this is not actually the case, because Qisas provides 
diversion as a means to mitigate the penalty to Diyyat (blood-money). If the victim or his or 
her relatives (in the case of murder) forgives the offender, then the penalty will be mitigated 
as mentioned in the Qur‘an.  
 
Punishments for Qisas and Diyyat Offences  
 
1. Murder  
The Prophet Muhammad named murder as one of the four greatest sins in Islam:
143
 
Narrated by Anas bin Malik:  
The Prophet said, ―The biggest of Al-Kaba‟ir (the great sins) are (1) to join others as 
partners in worship with Allah, (2) to murder a human being, (3) to be undutiful to 
one‘s parents, and (4) to make a false statement, or to give a false witness.‖ (Emphasis 
added) 
 
According to Muslich, the punishment types applied to the murderer are as follows:
144
 
1. Basic Punishment.  
a. Qisas.  
For murder, the qisas is capital punishment.  
b. Kaffarat  
This punishment entails freeing a slave or fasting for two months,
145
 and is subject to 
debate. The Syafi‘i school argues that as one of the main forms of punishment, this is a 
basic punishment for the offender. However, according to the Hanafiyah, Malikiyah, and 
Hanabilah schools, this is not a basic punishment in the case of murder. 
2. Substitute Punishment. 
a. Diyyat.  
The above qisas can be mitigated through conversion into diyyat if the victim forgives 
the offender. In this case, the offender should pay diyyat amounting to 100 camels or 
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 The payment of the diyyat should come from the offender‘s own assets 
and should be paid as a lump sum with no installments.  
b. Ta‟zir.  
This is a substitute punishment, and its implementation is subject to the policies of each 
state. According to the Malikiyah School, if the qisas is diverted because of forgiveness, 
then the offender is obliged to comply with ta‟zir. The ta‟zir punishment prescribed for 
murder by the Malikiyah School is 100 lashes and exile for one year. Nevertheless, many 
Islamic scholars do not consider ta‟zir to be mandatory for murder. In this case, the judge 
is given the authority to decide whether to impose ta‟zir. 
3. Additional Punishment.  
The additional punishment for murder is cancellation of the offender‘s will and inheritance 
rights. This additional punishment is based on a hadith narrated by Nasa‘i and Daruquthni 
that there should be no inheritance rights for a killer.  
 
2. Manslaughter that resembles murder (Alqatlu syibhul amdu) 
Manslaughter that resembles murder refers to a crime in which the offender 
intentionally commits an unlawful act, but does not intend to kill the victim. However, the 
crime culminates in the death of the victim.  
The punishments for this criminal offence are: 
1. Basic Punishment. 
a. Diyyat. 
The amount of the diyyat is the same as for murder. However, in this case there are 
several differences in the payment modality compared with murder. One of these 
differences is that the payment for manslaughter that resembles murder may be made 
by the offender‘s family in installments within three years.  
b. Kaffarat  
Except for Malikiyah, most Islamic schools agree that kaffarat, which involves freeing a 
slave or fasting for two months, is a basic punishment for manslaughter that resembles 
murder. However Maliki‘s school (Malikiyah) opined that there was only one basic 
punishment for this crime, namely, diyyat.  
2. Substitute Punishment. 
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The substitute punishment for this crime is ta‟zir. If the diyyat cannot be enforced 
because the victim grants forgiveness, or because of other reasons, then the state 
(represented by the judge) may mitigate the punishment through its conversion into ta‟zir 
that is appropriate to the offense (depending on the judge‘s consideration). 
 
3. Additional Punishment.  
The additional punishment for manslaughter that resembles murder is also cancellation 
of the offender‘s will and inheritance rights. According to Al Hadith, a person who commits 
homicide may not receive an inheritance. According to Muslich, the word ―qootilun” (killer) 
in the hadith narrated by Nasa‘i and Daruquthni refers to homicide in general, including 
murder and manslaughter.  
 
3. Manslaughter by mistake (Alqatlul khoto) 
Manslaughter by mistake means that the offender had no intention either of committing 
a criminal act or of killing the victim. However, in this case an element of negligence or 
recklessness can be attributed to the offender. The punishments for this criminal offense are:  
1. Basic Punishment. 
a. Diyyat  
The amount of diyyat in cases of manslaughter by mistake is the same as in cases of 
murder and manslaughter that resembles murder, i.e., 100 camels. The difference is 
that the camel breed for this diyyat is less expensive than for the previous diyyat. 
Islamic scholars have termed this diyyat mukhafaffah (light diyyat), whereas the 
previous diyyat is known as diyyat mughalladzah (heavy diyyat). Like manslaughter 
that resembles murder, the diyyat for this crime may also be paid by offender‘s family 
in installments within three years.  
b. Kaffarat (Freeing a slave or fasting for two months)  
2. Substitute Punishment 
The substitute punishment for this crime is merely fasting for two months, if the 
offender fails to find a slave to be freed as the kaffarat. All Islamic scholars agree that 
there is no ta‟zir as a substitute punishment for this crime.  
3. Additional punishment. 
With the exception of Imam Maliki, most Islamic schools agree that the additional 
punishment for this crime is cancellation of the offender‘s will and inheritance rights. 
Imam Maliki opined that manslaughter by mistake did not entail the loss of the 
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offender‘s will and inheritance rights. This was because the offender did not intend to 
kill the victim. Moreover, the initial act is not categorized as a criminal act.  
 
4. Deliberate and nondeliberate maltreatment  
Classification of the above criminal offenses is determined by whether or not the crime 
is intentionally committed and by considering its severity. In general, the main punishments 
for these crimes are qisas. However, these can be mitigated through their conversion into 
diyyat and ta‟zir punishments if the victim forgives the offender.  
In conclusion, for qisas and diyyat, the victim is given the right to determine the best 
punishment for the offender. The victim also is given an opportunity to forgive the offender, 
which results in certain legal consequences. Therefore, qisas and diyyat may be dropped if 
the victim grants forgiveness, or if sulh (reconciliation) occurs.  
 
3.2.3 Ta‟zir 
Ta‟zir is the third category of criminal offenses and their punishment in Islamic criminal 
law. Etymologically, the root of the word ta‟zir is azzar, which has four synonyms, one of 
which is addaba meaning ―to educate.‖ According to Al Mawardi, cited by Muslich, 
terminologically ta‟zir means a punishment that has an intrinsically educational characteristic 
and has not been prescribed by syara.
147
 Therefore, ta‟zir crimes include all crimes that are 
not classified as hudud, qisas, and diyyat. However, several of the latter crime categories can 
also be categorized as ta‟zir crimes if there is doubt concerning the evidence, or if the 
requirements concerning elements of the crime are not fulfilled. These include, for instance, 
cases where the value of the stolen object is less than a quarter dinar.  
Ammar propounds that all forms of restorative justice programs such as mediation, 
conferences, and compensation for the victim may be implemented with little resistance in 
the ta‟zir category.148 I suggest that ta‟zir is both a category of crime and punishment in 
Islamic criminal law that has the ability to adapt with a society‘s development. Therefore, I 
argue that it is possible to implement restorative justice within the framework of Islamic 
criminal law. Moreover, forgiveness in Islam is encouraged and highly rewarded by God. To 
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―God shows his mercy to those who are merciful, have compassion to creatures on 
earth so that those in heaven may have mercy upon you‖ (narrated by Tirmidzi Kitab 
Al-Birr, Hadith No. 48). 
 
―Every kindness will be rewarded tenfold‖ (narrated by Bukhori, Kitab Al-Sawm, 
Hadith No. 56). 
 
―I guarantee that anyone who does not fight even when provoked, shall be given a 
mansion in paradise‖ (narrated by Tirmidzi, Kitab Al-Birr, Hadith No. 58).  
 
A strong person is not the one who beats his rivals in wrestling, but a strong person is 
the one who controls his anger (narrated by Bukhari, Kitab Al-Adab, Hadith No. 76).  
 
A generous person is close to God, close to human being[s], close to Paradise, and far 
from Hell (narrated by Tirmidzi, Kitab AlBirr, Hadith, No. 40).  
 
3.3. Police-Community Partnership Forum (FKPM) as a modern form of Adat Law
150
 
The Police-Community Partnership Forum (FKPM) is another mechanism for 
restoratively resolving disputes, including criminal disputes, outside of the criminal justice 
system. It is a communication medium between the police and the community that is 
voluntarily conducted to discuss social problems that need to be resolved by the community 
and the police to support police function.
151
 
FKPM is based on police discretionary power that is assured through its legal grounding 
in the Ordinance of Indonesian Police Chief Number 7/1998 and the Decree of Indonesian 
Police Chief (Skep/433/VII/2006).   
According to the above legislation, subjects under the jurisdiction of FKPM are:
152
 
1. All cases that are stipulated in Book III (Misdemeanors) of the Indonesian Penal Code.  
2. Criminal offenses that incur the imposition of a maximum sentence of three months of 
imprisonment.  
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3. Petty crimes: light maltreatment of animals (Art. 302), light maltreatment (Art. 352), light 
theft (Art. 364), light embezzlement (Art. 373), light fraud (Art. 379), simple receiving of 
stolen property (Art. 482), and simple defamation (Art. 315).  
4. To resolve social conflict.  
Ideally, an FKPM should be formed in every Indonesian village, which would 
theoretically result in a total of 72,944 FKPMs in the country.
153
 However, because of several 
problems, there is generally one FKPM formed for every three villages.
154
 
The FKPM structure consists of one police officer and several community 
representatives who are selected through a deliberation process (musyawarah). Community 
here means either a geographical community or a community of interest.
155
 Therefore besides 
a FKPM that is formed based on a geographical community, a FKPM may also be formed 
based on a community of interest, for example, one involving a profession, ethnicity, religion, 
or hobby. For instance in Pandeglang Regency, Banten Province, a FKPM has been formed 
by a community of ojek drivers.
156
  
The chair of the FKPM should always be from the concerned community. The police 
officer‘s role is merely that of either the secretary or the vice chair of the FKPM. According 
to Hermanto, this is to ensure fairness in the process of settling a case within a community.
157
 
Typically the structure of the FKPM consists of a chair, a secretary, and divisions that differ 
from one FKPM to another.  
Lasem, a subdistrict in Rembang Regency, is considered to have successful FKPMs. 
Lasem is constituted by twenty villages, and therefore has twenty FKPMs. 
Since their establishment in 2007, the FKPMs in Lasem have settled 19 cases outside of 
the criminal justice system. These cases include domestic violence, adultery, fights between 
villages, theft, inheritance, and irrigation conflicts. Interestingly, some of the cases mentioned 
above are not within the subject-matter jurisdiction of FKPM as previously discussed. In fact, 
two of these cases, inheritance and irrigation conflict, belong to the jurisdiction of civil law 
rather than criminal law. It seems that in front of FKPMs, the concept and practice of 
separating civil law and criminal law had become somewhat blurred. In my view, FKPM is a 
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transformed form of adat law that has been adapted to the current context. 
There are two noteworthy cases involving domestic violence and theft, respectively, that 
I will discuss here.  
The domestic violence case involved a young married couple engaged in a quarrel that 
resulted in physical domestic violence committed by the husband. The husband rammed his 
wife‘s head into the wall. She consequently sustained severe injuries to her head and a 
bruised eye. Hermanto, the head of the community counseling unit at Lasem Sector Police, 
stated that he and the other FKPM members at Karasgede village waited three days for the 
situation to subside before offering the couple the option of solving the case through the 
FKPM. The couple, their parents, and officials of the FKPM met in a musyawarah forum 
(conference) to discuss the case and determine the best resolution. Together, they solved the 
case, agreeing to end the domestic violence case peacefully. The husband admitted that he 
was wrong and apologized for what he had done and the wife granted him forgiveness. The 
conference culminated with a joint decision letter that included a promise that the act would 
not be repeated, a decision to divorce, and the return of the wife‘s certificate of vehicle 
ownership.  
The chair of a FKPM, as the mediator, along with official members should also check, 
post-conference, whether the agreed points in the joint decision letter have actually been 
implemented. In this case, following the conference, Hermanto as the vice chair of Karasgede 
FKPM heard and received a report that the husband had postponed implementing one point in 
the joint decision letter i.e., the return of the certificate of vehicle ownership to his wife. 
Hermanto then met the husband and found that the certificate had been pawned to a pawn 
shop. Adopting a personal approach, Hermanto reminded the husband how important the joint 
decision letter was. The husband then made some efforts to get the certificate back and 
returned it to his wife.  
Interestingly, although the decision to divorce was included in the joint decision letter, 
the young couple decided to continue their marriage. According to Hermanto, they actually 
still loved each other; the decision to divorce was based on their parents‘ suggestion. 
The second case of theft involved a teenager who stole part of a scale at a traditional 
market in Lasem. The boy was later apprehended by a villager when he tried to sell the stolen 
good. The case was handed over to the FKPM to be solved. A conference was held with the 
juvenile delinquent and his parents, the victim, and FKPM members who deliberated and 
sought the best outcome for the case. The parents of the juvenile felt ashamed of what their 
son had done. Both the juvenile and his parents apologized to the victim. The victim, who 
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had merely sought an apology from the offender, accepted their apology. Nevertheless, the 
delinquent‘s parents insisted on giving back something equivalent to the stolen object, that is, 




The same outcomes for the above-mentioned cases that were settled within an FKPM 
may not have been achieved within the traditional criminal justice system. Although a 
juvenile offender would have the same feelings of shame if s/he was charged under the 
criminal justice system, that shaming is qualitatively different from the kind of shaming that 
occurs within a conference setting such as a FKPM. This argument is probably in line with 
what Braithwaite called reintegrative shaming that differs from disintegrative shaming within 
the traditional criminal justice system. To clarify the difference between these two varieties of 




The crucial distinction is between shaming that is re-integrative and shaming that is 
disintegrative (stigmatization). Re-integrative shaming means the expression of 
community disapproval…. is followed by a gesture of reacceptance into the 
community of law-abiding citizens … Disintegrative shaming (stigmatization), in 
contrast, divides the community by creating a class of outcast  
 
Furthermore, Zehr described the shame that is invoked within the traditional criminal 




The shame that our criminal justice system reflects is a stigmatizing shame. It says that 
…what you did is bad, but you are also bad, and there is really nothing you can 
do…You will always be an ex-offender. 
 
FKPM evidently offers Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) in lieu of the criminal 
justice system. The typical process of dispute settlement would proceed as follows. In most 
cases, the incident would be reported by the victim to a FKPM member. The FKPM would 
then follow up, analyze the case, and determine the interest parties that should be invited to 
the FKPM forum. Usually the parties that attend the forum are the victim and his/her 
supporters, the offender and his/her supporters (the supporters are mostly family members), 
the chair and secretary of the FKPM, and other FKPM members or parties if needed, 
depending on the case. The forum is led by the FKPM chair as the mediator. If mediation is 
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successful, the process will be concluded with the establishment of a joint decision as an 
agreement that focuses on three main outcomes. These are an apology, redress, and a promise 
that there will be no repeat offense. So far, there has been no case of failed mediation in 
Lasem. However, if the mediation ends in a disagreement, the case will be transferred to the 
formal criminal justice system. Schematically, the whole process of ADR within a FKPM is 
illustrated below:  













The place for holding the conference, as shown in the above scheme is usually a police-
community partnership office (Balai Kemitraan Polisi dan Masyarakat). This is commonly 
set up in a village-based office (kantor desa). However in practice, this location is flexible 
following the choice of the disputant parties. The mediator should make sure that the 
conference venue is a neutral one for both the victim‘s side and the offender‘s side.  
 
3.4 Conclusion. 
In conclusion, redress or compensation, remorse, repentance, forgiveness, and 
reconciliation are values of restorative justice that exist within adat criminal law, Islamic 
criminal law, and community policing. These three legal practices still prevail regarding 
particular subject matter jurisdiction in Indonesia, and are recognized by Indonesian law. As 
the discussion in this chapter affirms, restorative justice values are embedded within them. In 
my view, they will play an important role in developing the concept of restorative justice in 
Indonesia. Therefore, I suggest that particular values that share similarities with the notion of 


























Indonesia. These would provide a valuable base for implementing formal, state-recognized 
programs of restorative justice in the near future. This chapter reveals that restorative justice 
is not an alien concept for most Indonesians, and would probably be accepted without any 
significant resistance. Moreover, the values that I have described are broad-based values 
regardless of religion or ethnicity.  
 In the next chapter, I will discuss restorative justice for juveniles in the particular 
context of Indonesia. In my view, it is in this context that these three legal practices will 









































Chapter Four  
 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE FOR JUVENILES IN INDONESIA 
 
Children are a national asset that ensures the sustainability of a country. They carry the 
future of a nation on their shoulders. Therefore, it is necessary to devise a set of safeguards 
for children to protect them during the period of their physical and mental development. 
However, they may experience problems in their lives, for example, if they come into conflict 
with the law. Therefore, special methods of evaluation and treatment should be formulated 
specifically for children who are in conflict with the law. In this context, restorative justice 
plays a very important role in safeguarding these children‘s future. 
In the Indonesian context, the population within the age range of 0–17 years was 82.6 
million in 2011. This means that 33.9%, or more than one third of Indonesia‘s population, is 
composed of children.
161
 The age categories and the terms ―child‖ or ―children‖ used here 
refer to those described in the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child.
162
 Within the field 
of criminal law, a specific term carries legal consequences. There are two categories for the 
term ―child‖ in criminal law: (1) a child as someone considered too young to bear criminal 
responsibility, and (2) a child as someone perceived as being able to bear criminal 
responsibility. The first category is often simply called a ―child,‖ whereas terms for the 
second category vary according to each country. In New Zealand, for example, the term 
―child‖ is applied to the first category and the term ―young person‖ is applied to the 
second.
163
 For this thesis, I employ the term ―juvenile‖ when referring to the second category, 
and ―child‖ for the first category.164 Therefore, stipulating the age of criminal responsibility to 
distinguish between a child and a juvenile is a critical matter in the field of criminal law. In 
Indonesia, some changes have been made to the categorization of a child and juvenile as I 
describe below.  
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 Kementerian Pemberdayaan Perempuan dan Perlindungan Anak dan Badan Pusat Statistik. Profil Anak 
Indonesia 2012 (Indonesian Child Profile 2012) (Jakarta. 2012) 5. 
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years…‖ See UN Resolution 44/25 of 1989 on the Convention on the Rights of the Child.  
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4.1 Age of Criminal Responsibility for Juveniles  
The United Nations (UN) Resolution Number 40/33 of 1985 on UN Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (often called ―The Beijing Rules‖) recognizes 
that juveniles need special treatment owing to their early stage of human development. This 
special treatment includes particular care and assistance relating to their physical, mental, and 
social development. Beside these, they also require legal protection in conditions of peace, 
freedom, dignity, and security. Therefore, formulating the age of criminal responsibility for 
juveniles is one measure for creating a safeguard that ensures special treatment for juveniles.  
The Beijing Rules do not stipulate a fixed age of criminal responsibility for juveniles. In 
their Annex, they merely state that the age at which criminal responsibility commences 
should not be fixed at too low a level.
165
 This is because the formulation of law depends on 
the history and culture of a nation. In Japan, for instance, the age range for criminal 
responsibility is set between 14 and 19 years,
166
 whereas in New Zealand it is set between 14 
and 17 years.
167
 The formulation of the age limit thus differs among countries depending on 
their individual economic, social, political, and legal systems.
168
 
In the context of adat criminal law, the provision on the minimum age of criminal 
responsibility of juveniles varies between adat laws. In the case of the Baduy, the age of 
criminal responsibility is set at 10 years as the minimum age and 15 years as the maximum 
age. If a juvenile commits a criminal act, s/he is relocated from the youth camp (a male youth 
above the age of 15 years sleeps in the village hall and is educated by the Pu‟un) to the 
parents‘ residence as the first application of Baduy jurisdiction. If the parents declare their 
inability to reeducate their child, the child is then handed over to the adat jurisdiction to be 
educated.
169
 A child below 10 years, who commits a crime, will be returned to his/her parents. 
All the harm or damage caused by the crime will be repaired by the parents.
170
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Regarding Islamic criminal law, Al Quran and Al Hadith do not specify the age of 
criminal liability for minors.
171
 The Quran merely states a general condition, baligh.
172
 
Therefore, ulama (Islamic scholars) have conducted ijtihad
173
 to determine the baligh criteria, 
as delineated by Ali Imron and depicted in Table 2 below.
174
 
Table 2: Baligh Criteria  
 
No  Legal School  Baligh Criteria 
1 Syafi‘i School  
 
Males or Females: 
1. Has reached the age of 15 years (lunar year), 
and/or  
2. Discharges semen (minimum age of 9 years old)  
3. Pubic hair growth 
Females :  
1. Menstruation, and/or 
2. Pregnancy  
The average age for males and females is 15 years old.  
2 Maliki School  Males or Females: 
1. Discharge of semen regardless of the state of being 
asleep or awake  
2. Coarse pubic hair growth  
3. Hair growth in armpits  
4. The sense of smell becomes sensitive  
5.  Change in the vocal cords  
6. Age range is approaching or reaching 18 years old.  
Females: 
1. Menstruation  
2. Pregnancy  
The average age for males and females is 18 years 
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1. Minimum age of 12 years and/or  
2. Ihtilam (discharge of semen) regardless of whether 
or not this occurs through sexual intercourse  
3. Impregnation of a female 
Females: 
1. Menstruation, and/or 
2. Pregnancy  
3. Minimum age of 9 years  
The average age for males is 18 years old. 
The average age for females is 17 years old. 
 
4 Hambali School  Same criteria as Syafi‟iyah 
 
Stipulating the age of criminal responsibility for juveniles is a critical matter in Islamic 
criminal law, because a person to whom the baligh criteria do not apply should not incur the 
punishment of a hudud crime. Therefore, if a juvenile commits a hudud crime, the 
punishment should be mitigated to ta‟zir.  
 
In the context of Indonesia‘s current legislation, legal provisions for juveniles who 
commit crimes are contained in the Juvenile Criminal Justice System Act, hereafter referred 
to as JCJSA (Act Number 11/2012), and in the Juvenile Court Act, hereafter called JCA (Act 
Number 3/1997). Prior to the enactment of the above two Acts, they were stipulated in the 
Indonesian Penal Code (Act number 1/1946), Article 45
175
 of Chapter III pertaining to 
exclusion, mitigation, and enhancement of punishment.  
The Indonesian Penal Code known as Kitab Undang Hukum Pidana (KUHP) sets the 
maximum age of criminal responsibility for the juvenile category below 16 years. This means 
that those who commit crimes at the age of 16 years or over are legally treated as adults. 
However, the Indonesian Penal Code does not set a minimum age of criminal responsibility 
for juveniles. 
Article 67 of JCA provides the judge with three alternatives verdicts for minor 
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 (under the age of 16 years). These alternatives are: 
(1) The person found guilty may be returned to his or her parents, guardian, or foster parents 
without any sanction; 
(2) The person found guilty may be placed at the disposal of the government without any 
sanction. This may be applied if the person breaches a particular criminal
177
 act within 
two years of having previously been convicted for one of the criminal acts mentioned 
above.  
(3) The offender may be sentenced and punished.  
In criminal law, there are two kinds of sentence: punishment and treatment. The first 
two alternatives described above refer to treatment, whereas the third refers to punishment. 
Although the above provision considers treatment as a sentence to protect the future of 
minors by stipulating their maximum age limit of criminal responsibility, it fails to fulfill 
another important aspect of legal protection. It does not stipulate a minimum age of criminal 
responsibility. This omission conflicts with the recommendations of the Beijing Rules. 
Moreover, the concept of responsibility becomes meaningless without the stipulation of a 
lower age limit. Therefore, an amendment is required regarding the age of criminal 
responsibility and other critical matters relating to juveniles.  
In 1997, the Juvenile Court Act (Law No. 3/1997) was established to regulate and 
replace general legal provisions for juveniles under the KUHP, which was then repealed. 
Under this Act, juveniles between the ages of eight and eighteen years, who are also 
unmarried, fall within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. 
If a child below the age of eight years commits a delinquent act, the investigator will 
assess whether that child can continue to be educated by their parents or whether s/he should 




However, the age of eight years was subsequently considered to be too low for a 
juvenile to be held criminally responsible. There have been several cases that have triggered 
this consideration regarding the amendment of the minimum age of juveniles. One of these 
cases was the ―RJ‖ case, involving an eight-year-old boy who engaged in a fight with his 
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schoolmate. This case became one of the landmark contexts for a petition filed at the 
Indonesian Constitutional Court to amend the minimum age of criminal responsibility within 
JCA. The petition was filed jointly by the Indonesian Commission on Child Protection 
(Komisi Perlindungan Anak Indonesia) and the Medan Foundation of Studies and Child 
Protection Center (Yayasan Pusat Kajian dan Perlindungan Anak Medan).  
The Constitutional Court in its decision number 1/PUU-VII/2010 undertook a judicial 
review of the petition. It stated in its verdict that the phrase ―8 years old‖ in Article 1 verse 1, 
Article 4 verse 1, and Article 5 verse 1 of JCA, including its explanation, conflicted with the 
Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. The phrase was, therefore, conditionally 
unconstitutional and had no binding power unless it was reinterpreted as ―12 years old.‖ This 
minimum age for a juvenile was reaffirmed in JCJSA No. 11 of 2012, which will replace JCA 
on July 31, 2014, two years after its enactment.  
A simplified representation of the long history of formulating the age of criminal 
responsibility for juveniles in Indonesia is provided in Table 3 below:  
 
Table 3: The Age of Criminal Responsibility for Juveniles  
 






Penal Code - under 16 




minimum age in JCA 
from 8 to 12 
 
JCJSA 12 under 18 
 
4.2.The Necessity of Restorative Justice in the Case of Juvenile Delinquency  
 
Currently, juvenile cases fall within the jurisdiction of JCA, which does have several 
measures specifically for juvenile offenders to protect their mental development. These 
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include, for instance, holding the trial in camera,
179
 or disallowing representatives of law 
enforcement agencies from wearing formal uniforms when investigating, prosecuting, and 
trying juvenile offenders.
180
 However, the main weakness of JCA is that is it does not provide 
for any means of diverting a case.
181
 
Frequently, this weakness in law enforcement generates dissatisfaction and anger within 
Indonesian society. This has been evident in recent cases, such as those of RJ and AAL, 
involving juveniles who had to face adjudication by the juvenile criminal court. These cases 
highlight the flaws in the current juvenile criminal justice system. 
What follows are descriptions of the above two cases that draw attention to these flaws 
in Indonesia‘s current juvenile justice system. Both cases have been extracted mainly from 
media reportage.  
4.2.1 The RJ case: A Young Detainee
182
 
Is, a third grade elementary school student, stayed home for ten days. He did not want 
to go to school, because he was afraid of being bullied by his classmate, RJ, at 05663 
Elementary School in Langkat, North Sumatera. RJ used to bully Is by performing 
menokok
183
 on his head. An, Is‘s mother, reported the bullying to the school. As a result, 
Jamal, a teacher at the school, summoned RJ to address the situation. The teacher‘s 
investigation, however, became contentious. RJ denied that he had bullied Is. Jamal lost 
control and slapped RJ‘s face. Upset by his confrontation with his teacher, RJ went to look 
for Is to take revenge, but found only Ar, Is‘s elder brother, who was a sixth grade student at 
the same school. They fought and both were injured, with RJ suffering a bloody lip and a 
scratch to his face. Ar was more severely injured. Based on a doctor‘s visum et repertum 
(meaning ―seen and discovered‖), Ar sustained a bruised hip and ribs. His mother, An, then 
visited Edah, RJ‘s mother, asking her to take financial responsibility for Ar‘s medical care. 
An took Ar to a paramedic, but the pain did not stop and the paramedic suggested that An see 
a doctor. Since Edah refused to fund further medical treatment, An reported the case to the 
police. The RJ case subsequently went all the way up to the Stabat District Court in Langkat.  
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RJ failed to appear in court three times when summoned by the public prosecutor. 
When he finally appeared in court a week after his latest court summons, Justice Tiurmaida 
found him and his parent to be in complete disregard of the court and of the victim‘s interests, 
and decided to detain RJ. This decision incited considerable public tension and interest, 
because RJ was apparently under eight years old and there was no detention house for 
juveniles in North Sumatera. Therefore, RJ would have to share a room with an adult 
detainee. Sudjono Evi, the head of the Pangkalan Brandan Detention House, administered a 
special policy for RJ. Even though the judge‘s order was to detain RJ, Sudjono disobeyed the 
Stabat District Court order and released RJ. Justice Tiurmaida finally suspended his decision 
to detain RJ after his parents paid one million rupiah to Ar‘s family as redress.  
 
RJ was later found guilty, but returned to his parents without punishment.
184
 
Controversy concerning RJ‟s age  
According to Article 1 of Act No. 3/1997, a person who is over the age of eight years, 
but below 18 years of age, and not yet married, is considered to be a juvenile for the purposes 
of the juvenile court. RJ‘s exact age could not be clarified since several versions of his age 
existed. Based on his mother‘s testimony in the police investigation report, RJ was born in 
May 1997, which would make him eight years and three months old at the time that he 
committed the assault. His family card, however, indicates that he was born on December 9, 
1997, which would mean that he was just seven years and eight months old when the incident 
occurred. Therefore, the court, in this case could not try him and he could not be held 
criminally responsible. The prosecutor sought further evidence and found that RJ was born on 
December 5, 1996 based on his educational file at his elementary school. 
RJ‘s actual age was critical to determine whether he was old enough to be tried in the 
juvenile court. Ultimately, the court determined that RJ met the age requirement to be tried in 
the juvenile court based on the police investigation and RJ‘s educational file. However, 
public opinion held that RJ was too young to be tried and detained, because a family card is 
also significant evidence, and is a legal document.  
This became a landmark case for amending the minimum age of a child‘s criminal 
responsibility. The age of eight years was considered to be too young to bear criminal 
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responsibility. Currently, as I previously mentioned, the minimum age stipulated in Article 1 
of Law No. 3/1997 has been amended by the Constitutional Court to 12 years.  
4.2.2 The AAL Case185 
A 15-year-old boy, identified only as ―AAL,‖ became a symbol of the injustice of 
Indonesia‘s law enforcement system. The issue began when AAL and his friend found a pair 
of sandals near the house of a police officer, First Brig. Ahmad Rusdi Harahap. AAL took the 
sandals and put them into his bag. Later, in May 2011, Rusdi summoned AAL and charged 
him with the theft of his sandals. Rusdi‘s partner, First Brig. Simson Jones Sipayung, who 
was present with Rusdi during the informal interrogation, then beat AAL to obtain a 
confession. AAL‘s parents reported the beating to the police internal affairs division. The 
Central Sulawesi Police disciplinary court ruled against Rusdi and Simson and sentenced 
them to 21 days of incarceration at a police detention center. In retaliation, Rusdi filed a 
charge of theft against AAL.  
AAL was never detained, but the public was outraged by this case. Though AAL was 
believed to be guilty of stealing the sandals, the majority felt that juvenile criminal court was 
not the best solution for this case since the crime was not serious and AAL was only a 
teenager. A court process would too harshly stigmatize him as a thief. During the trial, many 
individuals, nongovernmental organizations, and the National Commission for Child 
Protection, a government agency concerned with children's issues, supported AAL and 
collected thousands of pairs of sandals that came to symbolize the perceived injustice of law 
enforcement. The movement was called ―1000 sandals to free AAL‖ and spread throughout 
the archipelago. Though the case occurred in Palu, Central Sulawesi, it gained prominence 




The collected sandals were given to law enforcement agencies, such as the police and 
the prosecutor‘s office, as these agencies were believed to be the most culpable for 
processing and passing the case to court.  
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Justice Rommel F. Tampubolon, a judge at Palu District Court, ultimately found AAL 
guilty of stealing ―someone‘s‖187 sandals. As with the RJ case, Justice Rommel returned AAL 
to his parents without imposing any punishment.  
 
4.3.Restorative Justice as a Safeguard for Protecting Children‟s Futures 
The RJ and AAL cases are just two among many cases involving juvenile delinquents. 
Widespread public support in relation to these cases reflects the general opinion that the 
criminal court process is an inappropriate way of settling criminal disputes involving juvenile 
delinquents, especially for petty crimes.  
Societal perceptions are also endorsed by the recommendations of the Beijing Rules. 
Point 6 of the general part of the Resolution states that: ―in view of the varying special needs 
of juveniles, as well as the variety of measures available, an appropriate discretionary scope 
shall be allowed at all stages of proceedings and levels of juvenile justice administration, 
including investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and the follow up of disposition.‖188 
According to the Beijing Rules, discretion is permitted in juvenile cases to enable 
diversion from the criminal justice system at all stages and levels. Diversion here, and also in 
the context of this thesis, means to divert a case into other dispute settlement processes 
instead of settling it in the criminal justice system. Therefore, the diversion operates before 
and outside of a criminal trial. This diversion is not constitutive of treatment provided in most 
material criminal law processes as a part of the sentence structure, besides punishment. Such 
diversions, as mentioned in the Beijing Rules, are acceptable, because juveniles play an 
important role as the next generation that sustains a state. This notion corresponds to that of 
the Declaration of The Rights of The Child (UN General Assembly Resolution 1386). The 
Declaration states that children shall enjoy special protection and shall be given opportunities 
and facilities, by law and other means, to enable them to develop physically, mentally, 
morally, spiritually, and socially in a healthy and normal manner, and under conditions of 
freedom and dignity. In the enactment of laws for this purpose, the best interests of the child 
shall be of paramount consideration.
189
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Based on this concept, we should determine the best method of settlement for juveniles 
in conflict with the law to create a safeguard that protects the future of children and juveniles. 
One such method is restorative justice.  
 
4.4.JCJSA: A New Chapter in Handling Juvenile Cases  
As I described earlier, the influence of the civil law tradition in Indonesia has rendered 
most legal provisions less flexible. This includes juvenile law, which is rigid and provides for 
no possibility of discretion or for a diversion program.
190
 Even if a case has already been 
resolved through musyawarah
191
 among the parties in conflict, as there is no legal basis for 
musyawarah in juvenile law, the state can exercise jurisdiction and ―reindict‖ the case. 
However, there are many cases that are not serious and that can be resolved through the 
application of musyawarah which has the same values and ideas as restorative justice. 
The perception of JCA as being obsolete has led to the birth of JCJSA, a new act that 
was passed by the Indonesian Parliament and enacted on July 30, 2012. JCJSA is founded on 
the principle that a juvenile who is in conflict with the law should have the right to special 
protection, including from incarceration. 
JCJSA includes three child categories: a juvenile as a delinquent, victim child, and 
witness child. Importantly, in contrast to JCA, it provides for a diversionary system in lieu of 
the criminal court. Here, a diversionary system should be understood not merely as a 
temporary criminal policy, but rather as a permanent system that is designed to settle and 
divert a case from the traditional criminal justice system process.  
JCJSA contains 15 chapters composed of 108 articles. The provisions regarding 
diversion as a restorative program are contained in chapter two. Article 6 declares the 
following objectives of diversion:  
a. To achieve reconciliation between the victim and juvenile;192 
b. To settle a juvenile case outside of the court process; 
c. To divert a juvenile from freedom deprivation; 
d. To encourage the community to participate; and 
e. To instill a sense of responsibility in the juvenile. 
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  In terms of restorative justice, a diversion program shares the same meaning as in Black‘s Law Dictionary: a 
program that refers certain criminal defendants before trial to community programs, on-the-job training, 
education and the like, which if successfully completed may lead to the dismissal of the charge. Bryan A Garner, 
‗Black‘s Law Dictionary‘ (New Pocket edn., 1998) 200 
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Musyawarah is a method for settling a dispute peacefully that involves all stakeholders. 
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 Juvenile here refers to a child in conflict with the law (child as delinquent) according to Article 1 of JCJSA. 
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It is obligatory to apply diversion to criminal offenses that are subject to sentences of 
not more than seven years of imprisonment and that do not involve recidivism.
193
 Outcomes 
of the diversion agreement, as provided by JCJSA, may be:
194
 
a. Reconciliation with or without redress;  
b. Return of juveniles to parents/guardians;  
c. Participation of juveniles in education or training at an educational institution or at the 
Institution of Social Welfare Exertion (LPKS/Lembaga Penyelenggaraan 
Kesejahteraan Sosial) for no longer than three months; or  
d. Community service. 
 
Musyawarah will be applied within JCJSA as a mechanism for implementing diversion, 
as stated in Article 8 subsection 1:  
―The diversion process is conducted through musyawarah involving the juvenile and 
parents/guardian, victim and/or parents/guardian, probation officer, and professional social 
worker based on the restorative justice approach.‖195 
The diversionary form of musyawarah that has now obtained a legal base in JCJSA can 
be seen to share the same approach as FGC.  
What makes JCJSA unique is that it offers three opportunities for juveniles to obtain a 
restorative settlement through diversion: at the investigation stage, the prosecution stage, and 
the adjudication stage.
196
 Thus, a conventional criminal trial becomes the ultimum 
remedium
197
 or last resort for settling a case if the diversion process fails to reach consensus. 
It should, however, be noted that under JCJSA, it is obligatory for the diversion process 
to be exercised by law enforcement agencies. If juveniles comply with the diversion process, 
they are subject to a sentence of not more than two years imprisonment, or a maximum fine 
of two hundred million rupias.
198
 The outcome of the diversion agreement is guaranteed by 
the head of the district court, thus ensuring that the agreement is legally acknowledged.  
The three stages of the diversion process in JCJSA are shown below:  
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 Article 7, subsection 1 of JCJSA. The provision of the penal sanction as a subsequent legal consequences of 
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 Article 11 of JCJSA. 
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should be the last resort after all other means fail to settle the case.  
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It is evident that the last three options for the diversion consensus in the above figure 
address the offender, whereas the first one is formulated to meet the victim‘s interest. 
Therefore, Eglash‘s observation that the victim is not the ―meat and potato‖ of the diversion 
process also applies here. JCJSA is still more offender-oriented than victim-oriented. 
However, this does not mean that JCJSA ignores the victim‘s interest. Many of its articles 
clear state that the victim plays a key role in determining whether or not diversion occurs 
since this process requires voluntary consent of the victim party.  
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 Based on Articles 7, 8, 9 and 13 of JCJSA. 
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a. Reconciliation with or without redress;  
b. Returned to parents/guardian;  
c. Participation in  education or training at 
an educational institution or at the Social 
Welfare Institution (LPKS/Lembaga 
Penyelenggaraan Kesejahteraan Sosial) 
for not longer than 3 (three) months or;  




4.5 Conclusion  
In conclusion, JCJSA is ‗a dream come true;‘ an act that can be predicted to protect 
the future of children and juveniles. Based on Indonesian legal history, it is unlikely that 
Indonesians would experience difficulty or resistance relating to the exercise of diversion, as 
stated in JCJSA. This is because musyawarah is a routine dispute resolution strategy in their 
daily lives. However, there are several points to be considered. To date, there have been no 
statistics available on the extent to which musyawarah has succeeded in resolving conflict in 
Indonesia. Restorative justice itself remains to be comprehensively evaluated. Whereas the 
data show some successful cases, others have met with failure. What is clear is that 
restorative justice is not a panacea. However, given the negative impacts of the current 
criminal justice system on juveniles, employing restorative justice for juveniles would be the 
best choice for handling juvenile cases. To minimize the failure of restorative justice, several 
preparations should be carried out in advance of its implementation. Among these, well-
trained mediators, safe and neutral places for both victims and offenders, and impartiality 
would be some of the critical factors that would determine the success of restorative justice. 
































POTENTIAL PROBLEMS AND CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTING 
RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN INDONESIA 
 
Recent experiences of law enforcement, as illustrated by the RJ and AAL cases 
described in chapter four, highlight the failure of modern law in the Indonesian context. The 
Indonesian Penal Code (WvSNI) was actually copied from the Netherland Penal Code 
(Wetboek van Strafrecht/WvS), though some changes were made in alignment with 
Indonesian society. Despite the enactment of JCA as lex specialis alongside the Penal Code, 
both share the same values. Whereas the Code and JCA reflect values of individualism, 
Indonesian societal values are more communal than individual. This conclusion is clearly 
recognized in the preamble of the Indonesian Constitution: ―…and achieving social justice 
for all the people of Indonesia‖ (emphasis added).200 Based on my study of Indonesia‘s legal 
history, I suggest that individualism is not, on the whole, suited to Indonesian culture. This 
has been practically evident in several instances of the failure of law enforcement, the RJ and 
AAL cases being just two examples.  
JCA‘s failure is that it provides no means for diverting a case in lieu of the juvenile 
court. This failure was even forecasted by a Dutch scholar hundreds of years ago. On October 
31, 1837, the Dutch Government appointed. C.J. Scholten van Oud-Haarlem as the chair of a 
committee formed to prepare the enactment of the legislation of the Netherlands in 
Netherlandsch-Indie (Indonesia) based on the principle of concordance. Scholten van Oud-
Haarlem then submitted the committee report to Raad van State, the highest level advisory 
institution in the Dutch Kingdom. However, J. Van der Vinne, a special member of the Raad 
van State, criticized Scholten‘s report, stating that the enforcement of Dutch law would not be 




―For a land that has millions of people who are not Christian and idol worshippers 
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The Indonesian Constitution was founded on five philosophical principles of the Pancasila which are 
officially stated in its preamble. Social justice is the fifth principle of the Pancasila. The other four are: (1) 
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preamble of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia. 
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 Supomo and Djokosutono, Sedjarah Politik Hukum Adat (Djilid II) (Political History on Adat Law (Volume 
II)) (Djambatan 1954)18–9. 
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with different religions and traditions, whilst its people who are Muslims have a huge 
loyalty to their religion, laws and written customary law, the prevalence of 
Nederland‘s law would be an infringement/breach of the rights and customs of non-
European people, and would also destroy their legal order and institutions that were 
previously connected to one another.‖ 
 
Cornelis van Vollenhoven, a Leiden scholar and proponent of adat law, also affirmed 
the existence of adat law. He reminded the Netherlander that: ―when the first ship flying the 
tricolor at its mast dropped anchor in the archipelago, the land was not constitutionally 
‗barren and empty‘. It was brimful with institutions of government and authority: there was 
government by and over tribes, villages, federations, republics and principalities‖202 
The above two scholars clearly conveyed their recognition of Indonesia‘s own values as 
reflected within adat law. Soekarno, the first president of Indonesia, named musyawarah as 
one of Indonesia‘s three greatest indigenous assets.203 Peter Burns defined musyawarah as a 
process of non-coercive negotiation involving all interested parties.
204
 
In my view, the lack of acknowledgement within JCA of the general values of adat law, 
such as musyawarah, and of some general Islamic values such as forgiveness and 
compensation, has led to its failure. The legal formulation of JCA disregards Indonesian legal 
culture. To further develop this argument, I propose to use the concept of legal culture 
introduced by Lawrence Meir Friedman, a legal sociologist at Stanford University.  
According to Friedman, a legal system consists of three subsystems. These are: a legal 
structure, legal substance, and a legal culture. The structure refers to the institutions and 
processes within a legal system. It is clearly a basic element of a legal system. The substance 
is composed of substantive rules as well as rules about how an institution should behave. 




Social forces are constantly at work on the law—destroying here, renewing there; 
invigorating here, deadening there; choosing what part of ‗law‘ will operate, which 
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 Peter Burns, The Leiden Legacy: Concepts of Law in Indonesia (KITLV 2004) 48.  
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 The other two assets that he named were gotong royong and mufakat. Gotong royong can be simply defined 
as people helping each other by working together. The terms musyawarah and mufakat tend to be applied 
together as one term. Mufakat is the result of the negotiation process, or the fruit of the musyawarah process and 




 Lawrence Meir Friedman, The Legal System. A Social Science Perspective (Russel Sage Foundation 1975) 15. 
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parts will not; what substitutes, detours and bypasses will spring up; what changes 
will take place openly or secretly. For want of a better term, we can call some of these 
forces the legal culture. It is the element of social attitude and value. 
 
This does not mean that legal structure and legal substance are less important. Friedman 
does acknowledge that both elements are real components of a legal system, but as he noted, 
they are best applied for designing a blueprint, not a working machine. Furthermore, 
Friedman argued that the problem with structure and substance was that they were static, and 
likened them to a still photograph of the legal system. This picture lacked both motion and 




According to Friedman, a legal culture refers to the attitudes, values, and opinions held 
in a society with regard to law, the legal system, and its various parts. He argued that a legal 
culture determines when, why, and where people use a law, legal institution, and legal 
process; and when they use other institutions, or do nothing. In other words, cultural factors 
are an essential ingredient in turning a static structure and collection of norms into a body of 
living law. Adding the legal culture to the picture is like winding up a clock or plugging in a 
machine. It sets everything in motion.
207
 
To apply these concepts to the Indonesian context, the legal substance of JCA, in 
particular, does not correspond with the legal culture. Even though JCA was enacted 
independently without Dutch intervention, it seems that Dutch values, rooted in individualism, 
have influenced some of Indonesia‘s legal scholars and practitioners. Individualism is clearly 
revealed at the practical level in an adversarial system that is not suited to Indonesian society. 
This perhaps can be understood by referring to the concept of non-transferability of law 
proposed by Robert B. Seidman, a professor emeritus at Boston University. According to 
Seidman, as cited by Tabalujan, the transference of rules from one culture to another does not 
work, because a rule cannot be expected to induce the same sort of role performance as it did 
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5.1 Possibilities, Obstacles, and Challenges in Implementing Restorative Justice for 
Juveniles  
As I noted in chapter four, JCJSA, which will replace the current JCA, provides for 
diversion as a means of implementing restorative justice. According to the framework of 
categories that I developed in chapter two, and the description of JCJSA that I presented in 
chapter four, the restorative justice approach entailed in JCJSA can be categorized as a 
conference in terms of its form. Regarding its timeline operation, restorative justice within 
JCJSA is a diversionary system with a multistage operation, meaning that there are three 
opportunities at different stages for implementing it: during the investigation, prosecution, 
and pretrial phases. In terms of its enforcement, restorative justice within JCJSA is basically a 
voluntary or purist model. However, with some exceptions, JCJSA can also be categorized as 
a coercive model in light of the provision on additional punishment in Article 71, verse 2. 
This states that fulfillment of an adat obligation (pemenuhan kewajiban adat) is an additional 
punishment within JCJSA. Therefore, if the judge hands down a verdict that includes 
fulfillment of an adat obligation, the convicted person should also comply with the obligation 
imposed by his/her adat. As previously discussed, adat law emphasizes repairing 
relationships, redress/compensation, and balancing the cosmos. Thus, coercive enforcement 
of restorative justice is possible within JCJSA, regardless of whether the juvenile offender 
consents.  
Considering the existence of restorative justice values within adat law and Islamic 
criminal law, Indonesian society is unlikely to experience any difficulty in exercising 
restorative justice. With JCJSA, adat law has found a legal base. Nevertheless, this does not 
mean that there will be no obstacles and challenges faced in implementing restorative justice, 
which in its official form, is a new method for handling criminal disputes in Indonesia. 
Therefore, in analyzing potential obstacles and challenges that may arise in the process of 
implementing restorative justice in Indonesia, we should look to a country that has prior 
experience of using a restorative justice approach. Some countries have already recognized 
restorative justice and are employing it. New Zealand is an example of a country that 
employs Family Group Conferencing (FGC) as its restorative justice program. It would, 
therefore, provide a good comparative example as the use of FGC for young persons through 




Though the statistics reveal several successful and satisfying cases that have been 
evaluated, a number of disappointing cases relating to the use of FGC have also been evident. 
Charles Barton cites studies done by Maxwell and Morris in 1990–91. Maxwell and Morris 
examined the perspectives of both victims and offenders who attended FGCs. From the data 
samples of the victims they researched, they found that victims willingly attended FGCs in 
only 41% of cases. In 49% of cases, the victims who attended FGCs felt satisfied with the 
outcome. About 25% of victims felt worse as a result of attending FGCs.
209
 
From the perspectives of offenders, Maxwell and Morris found that only a third of 
young offenders participated and often said little during their FGCs. In a sample of 14–16 
years old offenders referred to FGCs in 1990–91, 26% were reconvicted within 12 months, 




These pessimistic statistics constitute an important lesson for Indonesian law 
enforcement agencies and stakeholders who will be involved in diversion activities within 
JCJSA in the near future. Analysis of the unsatisfactory FGC results has led to the 
identification of some causative factors in their failure. Primary among these are lack of 
preparation, untrained mediators, and disempowerment. Braithwaite added that we cannot 
expect much from one two-hour conference.
211
 This means that preconference preparation is 
a critical factor in the success of a conference. In my view, the key lesson that emerges from 
these findings is the importance of a well-trained mediator who can mitigate the other two 
factors, namely, lack of preparation and disempowerment.  
However, ensuring that mediators are well trained, as a critical factor for ensuring 
successful implementation of restorative justice, is not easy to achieve at the practical level of 
musyawarah. Adequate time and sufficient preparation are required to hold a satisfying 
musyawarah, and a rushed effort can easily meet with failure. RJ‘s case exemplifies this point. 
Jamal, the teacher who tried to settle the case, failed to reach a consensus and restore peace. 
The worst outcome occurred as he could not control his own anger. Obviously, Jamal lacked 
the impartiality and training to be a good mediator. Impartiality is one of the keys to ensuring 
that a musyawarah is conducted fairly. If a party feels that the musyawarah is being mediated 
by a partial mediator, this is the first sign that it will proceed unfairly and fail. 
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Barton provides a criterion that could perhaps be an indicator of whether restorative 




Restorative justice fails in cases where one or more of the primary stakeholders is 
silenced, marginalized, and disempowered in processes that are intended to be 
restorative. Conversely, restorative justice succeeds in cases where the primary 
stakeholders can speak their minds without intimidation or fear, and are empowered to 
take an active role in negotiating a resolution that is acceptable and is right for them. 
 
Based on my experience and on the above guideline, I suggest that a potential obstacle 
in achieving diversion within JCJSA hinges on the mediator. As depicted in the JCJSA 
diversion flow chart (Figure 3) in chapter four, the diversion will be mediated by an 
investigator, prosecutor, or juvenile judge, depending on the stage of its occurrence. In my 
view, this is a weakness in JCJSA. As we already know, within the conventional criminal 
justice system, the roles of the investigator and prosecutor are to represent the state, while at 
the same time representing the victim. This joint role does not make them a good choice as 
mediators since their previous roles were not impartial. However, this lack of impartiality 
does not apply to a judge, as judges are required to be independent and impartial, even to the 
state. They do not represent any interest party; they represent justice.  
This hypothesis is in line with my research finding in Karasgede village in Lasem. 
According to Hermanto, a police officer in charge of maintaining twenty FKPMs in Lasem, a 
police officer should not be a mediator in the FKPM context. The mediator should be the 
chair of a FKPM, whose appointment results from deliberation within the community. 
Therefore, the fairness of musyarawah is assured and its outcome is easier to accept.
213
 
According to the data available on FKPMs in Lasem, a police officer is always appointed as 











 Hermanto (n 157). 
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As shown in the above figure, the police officer, Sholikin, is the vice chair of the FKPM. 
This FKPM structure is a typical one in Lasem. The Lasem police headquarters has 32 police 
officers. Twenty of them are vice chairs of FKPMs in villages in Lasem.
214
 Muharsono, the 
chair of the Karasgede FKPM, stated that he was appointed by the villagers as FKPM chair 
through a deliberation process and has since been a mediator in every conflict in Karasgede. 
―I do not know why they chose me, but every time I mediate cases, the disputants seem to 
listen to my directions and end up with a joint decision agreement (surat keputusan 
bersama).‖215  
Suyoto, the village head of Karasgede, said that prior to the establishment of the FKPM 
in 2007, people in the village tended to solve their conflicts through the mechanism of 
musyawarah without police involvement. ―Now with the inclusion of police in the FKPM, 
the decision among disputant parties is guaranteed by the police as the law enforcement 
agency, and is more certain (marem). Moreover, the result of the musyawarah is now written 
up in a joint decision agreement.‖216 
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FKPMs have demonstrated their effectiveness in handling conflicts within communities. 
However, I emphasize the point that the mediator is a decisive factor that may lead to a 
successful case of restorative justice. The disputants accept the written agreement without any 
resistance since they trust the mediator. Presumably, the same situation would not occur if the 
mediator was a police officer or prosecutor.  
In addition, the mindset of most police officers and prosecutors in Indonesia are 
predominantly influenced by the positivist paradigm. This makes them strict and overly rigid 
in following rules, regardless of variations and anomalies that occur within cases. Nani 
Rusiani, the acting head of the unit II, subdirectorate I, Directorate of General Crime of the 
Banten police region, stated that she often dropped juvenile cases and diverted them with the 
involvement of all the interest parties to musyawarah. Consequently, she was often blamed 
by her superior and ended up being given a new assignment in a different division. Previously, 
she headed the woman and child protection unit in the Serang police station.
217
 What Nani 
did, in fact, was to use police discretionary power in accordance with Article 18 (1) of the 
Police Indonesian Republic Act.
218
 Nevertheless, the use of this discretionary power is a 
never-ending source of debate between proponents of positivism and of ―living law,‖ even 
within the police force.  
Apart from a mindset that is partial and lacks independence within and beyond the 
police, public trust in Indonesia‘s law enforcement agencies is eroding. The social movement 
and solidarity that emerged in the AAL case testifies to public distrust in Indonesian law 
enforcement agencies, particularly the police and prosecutors. JCJSA attempts to reduce these 
potential problems by requiring the government to administer education and training for law 
enforcement agencies and related parties.
219
 Even so, the problem concerns not only the lack 
of ability to mediate, but also the nature of the roles of the police and prosecutor. Historically 
and intrinsically, these roles were designed to represent state interests, with the victim‘s 
interest being proportionately minor. Therefore, the roles of the police and prosecutor are not 
designed to be impartial in terms of mediation, which is required to be neutral towards all 
parties. Learning from the FKPM structure, I propose that the role of the mediator at the 
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investigation and prosecution stages should be shifted so that the investigator and prosecutor 























Normatively, probation officers (pembimbing kemasyarakatan) are not the principal 
mediators within JCJSA. However, they have a significant role in the diversion process since 
their duties include conducting research and providing a comprehensive report on juveniles in 
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the interest of the diversion process.
220
 They are also responsible for reporting to the court if 
the diversion process is skipped during the investigation and prosecution stages. In my view, 
the probation officer is more acceptable as a mediator than an investigator or a prosecutor.  
Another potential obstacle relating to the enforcement of JCJSA is synchronization 
among law enforcement agencies. This problem currently occurs within JCA. According to 
Article 59 (2) of JCA, in giving a verdict, a judge is obliged to consider the report on the 
juvenile submitted by the probation officer.
221
 In the commentary, the word ―oblige‖ (wajib) 
is noted as meaning that if this condition is not fulfilled, then the verdict is null and void 
(batal demi hukum). However, law in theory is not always the same as law in practice. 
According to Gusti Ayu, head of the subdirectorate of child protection and alleviation, 
Directorate General of Penitentiary of Justice Ministry,
222
 probation officers in the field 
complain that their reports are ignored by the prosecutor and judge, which does not occur at 
the investigation stage.
223
 The legal consequence of the verdict being declared null and void if 
the probation officer‘s report is not considered by the judge, as stated within JCA, does not, 
therefore, apply in practice.  
This provision is maintained within JCJSA and stipulated in Article 60 verses 3 and 
4.
224
 As shown in the scheme of the JCJSA diversion flow chart (Figure 3), the trial of a 
juvenile will be held only if all efforts at diversion fail to reach a diversion agreement, or if 
the agreement is not implemented.
225
 At this stage, a judge should consider the probation 
officer‘s written report on the juvenile before handing down a verdict. Lack of 
synchronization among law enforcement agencies in the implementation of JCJSA is another 
potential obstacle. Although this problem would probably not be entirely  apparent, this does 
not detract from its serious nature. Ignoring the probation officer‘s report would render the 
notion of conducting research on juveniles meaningless.  
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5.2 Bridging and Balancing Public and Private Interests within Restorative Justice  
The Beijing Rules suggest that efforts shall be made to establish a set of laws, rules, and 
provisions that are designed to:  
a.  Meet the varying needs of juvenile offenders, while protecting their basic rights; 
b.  Meet the needs of society; and  
c.  Implement the rules thoroughly and fairly.  
In many respects, the above criteria, particularly clauses a and b, are not easy to 
implement. Moreover, the victim can be considered as an additional variable. In civil matters, 
this problem would probably not occur since the conflict only involves each party and society 
or the public have no part in it. However, in criminal matters, society also has its needs in the 
words of the Beijing Rules, or its legal interest, to cite Gerry Johnstone. Restorative justice 
takes back the victim‘s rights from the state and returns them to the victim. It seems that 
restorative justice is leading to the collapse of the wall between civil and criminal matters. 
This does not, however, mean that society‘s interest can be totally abandoned as Johnstone 
points out, citing Zehr:
226
  
Since one cannot ignore the public dimension of crime, the justice process in many 
cases cannot be fully private. The community, too, wants reassurance that what 
happened was wrong, that something is being done about it, and that steps are being 
taken to discourage recurrence.  
According to Zehr, many proponents of restorative justice insist that the public 
dimensions of crime should not be considered more important than the private dimensions. 
Johnstone notes that finding a way of balancing these interests, in theory and in practice, is an 
important challenge facing those who campaign for restorative justice.
227
 
A conflict of interest between the victim and society may occur in many cases. 
Johnstone provides an example of a person who commits indecent assault against a relative 
and then offers generous restitution, a genuine apology, and agrees to undergo therapy that 
leads to the satisfaction of the victim, who then refuses to testify in a criminal trial. A 
question then arises: if the prosecutor thinks that the conviction and punishment of the 
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perpetrator is in the public‘s interest, would it be right to compel the victim to testify in the 
trial?
228
 Such a case, as described by Johnstone, would be a touchstone for restorative justice.  
Theoretically, I suggest that the answer to the above question hinges on the approach of 
Islamic criminal law, particularly qisas and ta‟zir. In terms of qisas, society should 
understand that it is the victim rather than society who has the predominant right. Therefore, 
the victim‘s decision should be respected.  
Interestingly, in Islamic criminal law, society‘s aspirations can also be considered in the 
context of ta‟zir. Its flexibility in adapting to society‘s development makes balancing and 
bridging the interests of victims and society possible. In the Islamic criminal law concept, 
relationships between humans (habluminannas) should be resolved among themselves when 
they are engaged in a conflict. This can be applied to the relationship between the victim and 
offender, which can encompass both families. The offender may sincerely repent to God who 
is most merciful, but the issue remains of crimes that belong to victims whose privilege and 
right it is to forgive. On the other hand, humans also have a relationship with God 
(habluminallah).
229
 In terms of the law, and with some notable points, this can be regarded as 
a public or state right. Repentance can be demonstrated by serving a punishment issued by 
the state. In short, the type of relationship determines to whom the perpetrator should be 
liable. According to Islamic criminal law, all human deeds should be accountable, whether in 
this world or in the hereafter. In terms of punishment, these two worlds are connected. 
Therefore, a perpetrator who is punished in this world will be spared in the hereafter. 
As I described in chapter three, ta‟zir means a punishment that has an intrinsically 
educational character not prescribed by syara. This means that the government decides on the 
type of punishment. Therefore, in cases where a crime is viewed as infringing both God‘s 
right and an individual‘s right, the fulfillment of both interests is possible through the 
application of restorative justice as well as a stipulated punishment (for instance, 
incarceration). However, in the context of Islamic criminal law, the stipulated punishment 
should not conflict with the Qur‘an and Hadist.  
To return to Johnstone‘s example, indecent assault in Islamic criminal law is 




 There is in fact a third category of relationship, which is the relationship between humans and nature. This is 
evident from several hadists, for instance, the hadist narrated by Ibn Majjah exhorting followers to conserve and 
not to waste water, even in a running stream, and even for ablution. See Ibn Majjah Hadith No. 419.  
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categorized as a ta‟zir crime that is related to dignity and morals (kehormatan dan kerusakan 
akhlak).
230
 In accordance with the nature of ta‟zir, the determination of the punishment for 
this crime is left to the state. Therefore, if on one hand a case of this kind is perceived as a 
breach of an individual‘s right and on the other hand it is also deemed an infringement of 
God‘s right (public right), then the offender could be punished by the state as well as be 
obliged to restore the victim. This does not mean that the offender receives double jeopardy 
(ne bis in idem) because these components, entailing separate responsibilities to the state 
(public) and to the victim, can be ―packaged‖ as one punishment. Moreover, as I discussed in 
chapter two, recently, the approach of integrating the victim‘s rights, for example, through a 
victim impact statement, restitution, and state compensation within a criminal trial has been 
proved to be possible.  
In short, the contention between public and individual interests may be alleviated by 
adopting the Islamic criminal law approach, particularly the concepts of qisas and ta‟zir, 
depending on the case. 
JCJSA provides clear-cut provisions. The use of diversion is obligatory in all criminal 
offenses requiring that the offender be sentenced to not more than seven years of 
imprisonment, providing that they do not involve recidivism, as I noted in chapter four.
231
 
This implies that diversion can be employed for a wide range of crimes. As Johnstone has 
shown, in general, indecent assault is one such crime that can be diverted. Chapter XIV of the 
Penal Code of Indonesia stipulates that indecent assault entails crimes against decency. The 
imprisonment period described within this Chapter is below seven years for all crimes 
committed by a juvenile in this context. An exception, however, is if an indecent assault or an 
obscene act results in the victim‘s death.232  
Clearly, introducing something new into a well-established system is not as simple as 
flipping a coin and resistance may occur. It is in this context that the contention between the 
victim‘s interest and public interest is likely to emerge. Prior to JCJSA, all the victim‘s 
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 This means that diversion may not be applicable for several crimes, for example, in the case of homicide. 
According to Article 338 of the Indonesian Penal Code, manslaughter may be punished by a maximum 
imprisonment of fifteen years. As lex specialis, JCJSA stipulates that the maximum imprisonment for juveniles 
is half of the maximum imprisonment for adults. Therefore, the imprisonment sentence for a juvenile in a 
manslaughter case may not be more than seven and a half years, which implies that diversion may not be used in 
a manslaughter case. See Article 79 (2) of JCJSA. 
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interests were taken over by the police and prosecutor, which reflected public interest. In the 
near future, the victim‘s interest will be returned to the victim, and public interest will be 
correspondingly reduced. I deliberately use the term ―reduced,‖ because the community still 
has a place in diversion. According to JCJSA chapter VIII, Article 92 (c) regarding 
community participation, a community may participate in a diversion. However, the victim‘s 
interest is paramount in JCJSA, particularly in the diversion process.  
However, responses of outrage that can occur, as in the RJ and AAL cases, can be 
viewed from a different angle. The lesson is that society is watching and has the power to 
show disagreement. Again, as I proposed earlier, the solution lies in the Islamic criminal law 
approach. As a Muslim-majority country, Indonesia still has a place for Islamic values within 
society. Apology, forgiveness, remorse, repentance, and compensation are some general 
Islamic values that, like common sense, can be easily accepted as broad-based values, 
regardless of religion. 
5.3 Conclusion  
In short, I conclude that four critical factors—the skills and qualities of the mediator, the time 
available for preparing the encounter of all of the involved parties, the mindset of the law 
enforcement agency, and synchronization among law enforcement agencies—may lead to a 
successful restorative justice program. Learning from the FKPM experience, I suggest that 
neither the police nor the prosecutor should be the primary mediator, because they are not 
designed to be an impartial party in contrast to the judge. Another point of note is that the 
Islamic criminal law approach can be utilized as a bridge to alleviate the contention between 
public and private interests within a restorative justice approach. On one hand, the 
implementation of this approach leads to public awareness that the victim has a right to 
decide the resolution for releasing his/her pain and mitigating the harm that was caused by 
the crime. On the other hand, public interest can still be accommodated through the 














Restorative justice is evidently becoming a wide-ranging concept that has been 
discussed, examined, and implemented in many countries and in various forms. Chapter two 
revealed that restorative justice is still evolving, leaving ample space for further discussion 
and transformation. Its flexibility and the rich variety of its forms make restorative justice 
adaptable to the many different characters of diverse nations. Chapter three affirmed that 
restorative justice has been practiced within adat law in Indonesia. Its values are also found 
within the practice of community policing in Lasem subdistrict and within Islamic criminal 
law. There is evidence of the existence and practice of Islamic law in Indonesia. The modern 
form of law that was introduced to Indonesia in the mid-nineteenth century led to the erosion 
of both adat law and Islamic criminal law.  
Chapter four presented two cases that revealed a gap in JCA as a representative form of 
modern law. JCA obviously does not have a means for diverting a juvenile case in lieu of a 
criminal trial. Restorative justice within JCJSA provides diversion as a means of addressing 
this gap. However, some potential challenges may occur in its implementation, which were 
discussed in chapter five.  
Chapter five revealed that the gap described above is rooted in the disregard of 
Indonesia‘s legal culture. A legal culture is a significant subsystem within a legal system. It 
can be viewed analogically as the soul of a body. The chapter demonstrated that restorative 
justice values are evident in the legal culture, values, and theories of adat law, community 
policing, and Islamic criminal law values, thereby providing convincing evidence that 
Indonesia has sufficient experience to implement restorative justice without facing significant 
resistance within society. It can be argued that restorative justice is a component of the legal 
culture of these systems, as I have described them.  
Chapter five also identified potential obstacles and challenges in implementing JCJSA, 
which center on the mediator and synchronization of law enforcement agencies. As a 
derivative conclusion, I suggest in this thesis that police officers and prosecutors should not 
be primary mediators within the diversion process. This recommendation is based on their 
intrinsic roles and positions, and on evidence obtained from my primary research conducted 
on an FKPM in Lasem.  
Another conclusion that relates to the second objective of this research is that a situation 
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of contending public and private interests may be alleviated by the adoption of Islamic 
criminal law values that are related to the concept of restorative justice. The values are 
general and plausible and can be accepted broadly regardless of religion and ethnicity in 
Indonesia. The ultimate conclusion of this thesis, as revealed by the sum of its findings, is 
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